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Abstract 
This study focuses mainly on whether Chinese financial news reports regarding 
the performance of Chinese domestic listed firms, after the firms' own earnings 
announcements, have any impact on the firm's stock prices, and an influence on their 
subsequent restructuring activities and accounting performance. We selected 119 
sample companies from 1998 to 2004. All of them had above industry median 
performance in the benchmark year, but had poor performance in the second year. 
We examined whether the media plays an important role in shaping the stock price 
movement of these companies with problematic performances and their following 
restructuring activities. Adopting the event study approach, we calculated the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of different news announcements and conducted 
t-tests to determine if the results are significant. Then, we searched for and compiled 
all news regarding the firms within two months after their earnings announcements; 
the number of news items was treated as an independent variable in the linear 
regression. Interestingly, our results found that the negative news reports do not 
actually have a significant effect on stock prices and subsequent restructuring 
activities. In further regression analysis, we still could detect any significant effect of 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
China's stock market is quite unique in some aspects. Stock investors in the 
People's Republic of China (PRC, herein referred to as China) are less sophisticated 
than investors in other countries and are not equipped with sufficient knowledge of 
accounting or finance. They have not yet developed the habit of reading firms' 
earnings announcements and of analyzing their financial status via public financial 
statements. Therefore, they are quite insensitive to a company's performance even if 
the company is experiencing an earnings decline. This aversion to researching 
company information causes inefficiency in the stock market. Furthermore, the 
insufficient monitoring of publicly traded companies by the Chinese government also 
spoils corporate governance. The Chinese legal system and regulatory institutions 
have limited effectiveness in regulating companies. Under such circumstances, some 
other power must be sought to fulfill the monitoring role for the Chinese stock 
market. 
In developed countries, where market economies are well established, the media 
can greatly influence companies' stock prices and corporate governance in the 
following ways: 
First, according to the efficient market hypothesis①，a semi-strong efficient 
® "An 'efficient' market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers 
actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and where important 
current information is nearly freely available to all participants. In an efficient market, competition among the 
many intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual securities 
already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already occurred and on events which, as 
of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an efficient market at any point in time the 
actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value." 
Fama( 1965), page 6 
8 
market means that all publicly available information is fully reflected in the stock 
prices. Therefore, once news reports on a certain company are released, the 
company's stock prices will change immediately to reflect the information in the 
news. 
Second, as for the media's influence on corporate governance issues, Lowenstein 
(1996，1999) argues that the media influences corporate boards to be more effective 
because it creates fear that shareholders will sell their shares in response to negative 
press coverage. 
Third, Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors 
have an incentive to be effective monitors of senior managers to signal to 
shareholders and labor markets their value as experts in decision control. Negative 
media coverage of firm performance may affect director reputations and create an 
incentive for directors to remove the CEO in an effort to salvage their reputations. 
Fourth, according to Farrell and Whidbee (2002), the number of news reports 
about a single company could substantially influence a company's corporate 
governance. To be more specific, the increased scrutiny of firm performance by the 
financial press puts pressure on the board to make some changes to the company's 
governance, such as removing the CEO. Therefore, more media exposure could 
simply impose more pressure on a company's corporate governance. 
In China, although media is comparatively tightly controlled by the government, 
media could play an important role in monitoring listed companies as long as the 
media monitoring is not harmful to the authority of the Party and the government. In 
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other words, news reporting on economic issues does not need to be controlled as 
strictly as news reporting on political issues. 
Some real-life cases show Chinese media's power on listed companies. Take the 
case of Lantian Co. for example; the company's serious accounting problem was first 
revealed by a 600-word article in Financial Consultation, a subsidiary journal under 
Financial Times. This article unmasked the company's accounting fraud, and caused 
banks to stop lending money to Lantian. Subsequently, a more detailed analysis of 
Lantian's accounting problems was published in major financial journals which 
finally resulted in 10 senior Lantian managers being sued and the delisting of Lantian 
Co. from Shanghai Exchange. From this case, it can be seen that the Chinese media, 
especially financial media, are able to monitor the corporate governance of listed 
companies. 
In a word, news reports can influence stock prices and corporate governance to a 
large degree. Therefore, there is a need for a partial reliance on media to monitor 
corporate governance. However, can this theory actually be applied to Chinese 
companies? If so, how much influence do the Chinese media have on listed 
companies? And, how powerful is the Chinese media in shaping corporate governance? 
We expect that media reports on firms attract the attention of shareholders and 
consequently influences public views of the firms. Changes in public views 
subsequently impose pressure on firms' corporate governance, which results in firms 
restructuring activities to improve overall performance. 
Therefore, in the first part of the econometric study, to see how the news reports 
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about specific firms' earnings decline after earnings announcements, we applied the 
standard event study and estimate cumulative abnormal return (CARs) after earnings 
announcement and news reports using the market model. With these data, we assessed 
the efficiency of press monitoring in the Chinese stock market and determined how 
the market reacts to the different types of news reports. For example, we studied 
whether the market reacts differently to news reported in newspapers with different 
circulation numbers. 
Without an effective monitoring mechanism and investor sophistication, we hope 
that press monitoring can play an important role in corporate governance. However, 
the results from the CAR calculation do not provide strong evidence to support this 
hope. To be more specific, our studies showed that the market does not react 
negatively to most negative news. 
In the second stage of the quantitative work, to further investigate the role that the 
media plays in firms' stock performance and corporate governance, linear multivariate 
regression models with limited dependent variables are introduced. We used CAR 
from the previous event study as the main independent variable, while "count 
variables" indicating the number of restructuring activities were selected as the 
dependent variable. Meanwhile, the logarithm of firm total assets, which stands for 
firm size, percentage change in return on equity, the dummy variable CEO 
background� together with leverage ratio were used on the right side of our 
regression equation as control variables. Lastly, we look at the third year® return on 
® CEO_background equals one if the CEO is politically connected, zero if otherwise. 
® The "third year" refers to the year following the companies' performance declining year. 
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equity (ROE) change. The last part of the analysis aims to explain whether the 
number of restructuring deals effects the third year ROE change. Thus, the dependent 
variable in this regression is percentage change of ROE after earnings announcement; 
the independent variables include the number of restructuring activities etc. 
Unfortunately, the results are not significant either. 
In addition, to better understand the special circumstances for China, we give an 
overall introduction to the Chinese media system and its institutional background in 
Chapter 3. From this introduction, we find that the media system and financial news 
reports are strictly controlled by the Chinese government. 
After introducing the basic logic behind our work, we give a literature review. We 
found that the literature on the effects of media on economic issues is quite limited. 
Therefore, we believe ours is the first attempt to study the relationship between media 
exposure and corporate governance activities in China. We used Chinese stock market 
data, which will provide new evidence on the efficiency of Chinese firms' corporate 
governance. This thesis also requires innovative measures of media influences and 
their coverage, because the number of news can not simply stand for the influential 
power of the news. Consequently, a new variable “news influence coefficient" is 
invented for this research. We hope this research will fill the gap of media study in 
economic literature by providing some evidence of media effects on stock 
performance and corporate governance in China. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview of 
relevant literature in this field. Chapter 3 discusses the Chinese media system and 
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derives the hypothesis. Chapter 4 explains dataset and the sample selection procedure. 
Chapter 5 is the summary statistics of the sample. Chapter 6 provides details 
regarding the methodology of both the event study and regression models. Chapter 7 
gives a summary of the empirical results of the study; Chapter 8 is the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Farrell and Whidbee (2002) studied the impact of the financial press on forced 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover. Using a matched sample without CEO 
turnover, they found that firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 
76% more news regarding poor performance, despite being in the same industry and 
of similar size and performance as the matched firms. Besides this, they applied event 
study to explore whether the stock market responds differently to the CEO's decisions 
in the CEO turnover group and the matched group. We focused on the impact of press 
monitoring on stock prices and restructuring activities. 
Gadarowski (2002) examined whether the frequency of recent news about a firm 
can predict expected returns in a manner consistent with behavioral pricing theory. He 
found that a count of recent Dow Jones News Service stories, adjusted for equity 
capitalization, predicts differences in returns of about 4% per year for the average 
firm. Furthermore, the predictive power of news counts is concentrated among firms 
with low book-to-market ratios, with the highest news-count firms among low 
book-to-market firms earning returns 10% below those with the lowest news counts. 
A more general study by Dyck and Zingales (2002) suggests that media can pressure 
corporate managers and directors to behave in ways that are socially acceptable. 
Overall, they found that countries with a larger newspaper circulation have better 
environmental responsiveness. One important implication of this paper is that the 
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media pressures managers to act not just in shareholders' interests, but in a publicly 
acceptable way. 
Another influential paper regarding the media effect on corporate governance was 
written by Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2006). In this paper, the authors talked 
about the important function of media in the economic sphere. They state: “ The role 
of the media is to collect, select, certify, and repackage information. In doing so they 
dramatically reduce the cost economic agents face to become informed." Furthermore, 
they emphasized the media's role in forming the reputation of companies and 
professional managers. Another point worth noting is that they state the credibility of 
the media is crucial when influencing corporate governance via reaching the public. 
Their sample is a list of corporate governance violations. They coded the outcomes of 
companies with problematic performances after being revealed on the media into 0，1, 
and 2. Zero stands for nothing having happened to the company; 1 stands for a partial 
redress of the shareholder concerns; and 2 stands for a significant response in the firm. 
Interestingly, their paper discarded stock price as a measure of media effect due to its 
volatility. This point is enlightening for our research too. In contrast to our research, 
their research focused only on three main newspapers, while our research covers 
dozens of newspaper. They included reputation together with other variables as 
control variables. 
Other related works test firms' restructuring activities after performance decline. 
Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) investigated the relation between a firm's stock price 
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performance and subsequent changes in its top management. Consistent with internal 
monitoring of management, they found there is an inverse relation between the 
probability of a management change and a firm's share performance. However, their 
results showed that unless share performance is extremely good or bad, logit models 
have no predictive ability. 
John, Lang and Netter (1992) discussed large firms' voluntary restructuring 
activities as responses to performance decline. They found that facing the discipline 
of the product market most firms retrenched quickly and increased their focus. They 
classified the voluntary restructuring activities into three big categories: management 
turnover, changes in operation and organization structure and changes in financial 
policies. Their results showed that these firms' labor cost, cost of goods, R&D 
expense and debt/asset level all declined quickly. However, there was little turnover of 
top managers. 
Sudarsanam and Lai (1997) selected a sample of 297 U.K. firms whose stock 
returns declined from being in the top 50% of all U.K. listed firms to the bottom 20%. 
They studied corporate restructuring including impact of ownership, governance, and 
lenders, in response to performance decline. Similarly, Denis and Kruse (2000) 
examined the incidence of managerial control-reducing disciplinary events and 
corporate restructurings among firms experiencing a large decline in operating 
performance using samples that had above-median industry-adjusted operation 
performance in one year and were followed by industry-adjusted operation 
performance in the bottom quartile of the firms with the same minimum size 
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requirement the following year. Their sample selection method is also used in this 
thesis. Another paper by Kang and Shivdasani (1997) focused on the relationship 
between the performance decline and restructuring activities and mainly investigates 
Japanese cases. Their thesis documented the restructuring of 92 Japanese corporations 
that experienced a substantial decline in performance between 1986 and 1990. These 
firms implemented a number of downsizing measures such as asset sales, plant 
closures, and employee layoffs. 
As for market efficiency studies, one of the earliest studies is from Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969). Their paper examined the process by which common stock 
prices adjust to the information that is implicit in stock split news. Their evidence 
indicated that on average the market's judgments concerning the information 
implications of a split are fully reflected in the price of a share at least by the end of 
the split month but most probably almost immediately after the announcement date. 
Chan (2002) used a comprehensive database of headlines about individual companies 
to examine monthly returns following public news. He compared them to stocks with 
similar returns, but no identifiable public news. There is a difference between the two 
sets. They found strong drift after bad news. Investors seem to react slowly to this 
information. They also found reversal after extreme price movements unaccompanied 
by public news. These findings support some integrated theories of investor over- and 
under-reaction. 
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Lastly, as for studies regarding Chinese firms' corporate valuations or corporate 
governance issues, Bai, Liu, Lu, Song and Zhang (2002) researched the effects of 
Chinese firms' corporate governance on the firms' market value. They found that 
better-governed companies generally have higher stock market valuations. Their 
results showed that good corporate governance matters a lot in China's emerging 
stock market and Chinese investors are inclined to pay a higher price for companies 
with better governance. In their empirical studies, they used Tobin’ s q and P/B ratio 
as measures for corporate valuation. 
Another groundbreaking study about the relationship between 
politically-connected CEOs and Chinese companies' corporate governance was 
written by Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007). They found that firms with politically 
connected CEOs underperformed compared to those without politically connected 
CEOs. The interesting part of this paper is their definition of politically connected 
CEOs. They believe that if the CEO is a current or former officer of the central or 
local governments or the military, the CEO should be regarded as politically 
connected. They included a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is political 
connected in their OLS regression, while CAR is the dependent variable. This kind of 
practice is also used in our thesis. However, this method has its limitations which will 
be discussed later in the thesis. 
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Chapter 3. Institutional Background of the Political 
Control of Chinese Media 
First, we want to introduce the institutional arrangement of the Chinese media 
system. In 1949 when the People's Republic of China was established, the China 
Communist Party (CCP) nationalized all enterprises and entities, including the media. 
Currently, the majority of Chinese newspapers continue to be sponsored and 
controlled by the Chinese government. 
To be specific, in the People's Republic of China, the government interferes a lot 
with the media. Many of the largest media organizations (namely CCTV, the People's 
Daily, and Xinhua) are actually agencies of the government. There are certain taboos 
and red lines within the media, such as questioning the legitimacy of the Communist 
Party of China. 
Because of such a highly controlled system, and despite the large number of 
different newspapers in China, most publications simply repeat what Xinhua News 
Agency reports, because they are all controlled by the same authority. In other words, 
the content and attitude of most Chinese newspapers are highly consistent with one 
another. It is difficult to find different voices within Chinese local media. 
Similarly, the editors in chief of mainstream newspapers are assigned by the 
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
which is an internal division of Communist Party of China, and are usually 
government officials. 
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However, the situation has improved in recent years. Currently, most state media 
outlets no longer receive large government subsidies and are expected to make cover 
their operational budget through commercial advertising. They have begun to learn to 
produce programming or publish articles that people find attractive and interesting so 
that their circulation, and subsequently advertising revenue, can increase. Therefore, a 
higher degree of reporting freedom can be expected for the Chinese media. 
As for the Chinese financial media, it is also quite interesting to discuss their 
governmental background. China has set a special information disclosure system for 
the news of listed companies. To be more specific, the Chinese government has 
drafted a regulation that all listed firms' important information and periodical earnings 
announcements must first be published in the following five newspapers: China 
Securities, Shanghai Securities, Securities Times, Financial Times, and Economic 
Daily, among which Economic Daily has already transferred this right to its 
subsidiary newspapers Securities Daily, China Reform Daily, China Daily and 
Securities Market Weekly. In other words, the only way for the public to know the 
listed companies' announcements in the first place is to read those newspapers, which 
implies that the news reports from those newspapers will have significant effects on 
the stock market. 
This policy was generated under specific historical circumstances. Dating back to 
the early 90's, the regulations of the Chinese stock market, together with the 
information disclosure system, were incomplete and immature. However, the 
credibility and accuracy of financial information is extremely crucial to a healthy 
securities market and its listed firms. Therefore, to secure an ordered and stable 
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development of the stock market, the Chinese government formed this kind of 
institution arrangement. 
However, as time goes by, several drawbacks of this kind of institution have 
emerged. First, this kind of institution arrangement is apparently a result of 
government intervention. So, how can the medium ensure the justice and objectivity 
of its reports? In other words, this institutional arrangement has probably caused 
reports to be influenced by governmental attitudes and pressure. 
In addition, those newspapers dare not tell the truth about the listed firms, 
especially the negative sides of those firms, because they receive large amounts of 
advertising revenue and disclosure revenue� from those firms. 
Moreover, the newspapers always face threats from the listed firms when they 
revealed the negative side of the companies, because those companies generally have 
strong government relationships and social influence. The media faces the risk of 
being sued by companies facing scandals. Therefore, ensuring the media's freedom of 
speech requires further legal protection. 
Sometimes the worse a company's earnings performances are，the more reports 
emphasizing the positive side of the company will appear in newspapers. This 
situation may be due to unique aspects of Chinese culture and the special relationship 
between the media and corporations. Chinese companies have especially friendly 
relationships with the media by providing financial support to the media or giving 
advertisement business to the media. As a result, the media is inclined to report 
® The listed companies need to pay the appointed newspapers for their official earnings announcement disclosure 
and other official information disclosure. 
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positive news regarding the companies or try to cover up potential risks of the firms' 
operations from the public. Furthermore, the media in general does not dare to report 
the negative side of the companies because they are afraid of facing pressure from the 
local and central government. Because in China a large proportion of big companies 
are still state-owned, they can enjoy protection from the government, and at the same 
time, the government plays a dominant role in deciding the media's future. 
In a word, the freedom of current Chinese financial media is still limited. 
Lastly, when we look at the contents of media financial reports, we can discover 
the following implicit rules governing their content in the context of Chinese culture: 
1. The Chinese government strongly restricts the spread of negative news. 
2. Sometimes, the public needs to understand the opposite side of certain new items. 
For example, when reports emphasize strengthening corporate governance or say 
a firm has already made a lot of progress on performance, it may mean there have 
been some severe problems. 
Based on the above facts about the Chinese media system, we can develop 
several hypotheses: 
First, the number of clearly negative news reports regarding listed firms' 
performances is not largely due to the restrictions the Chinese media faces from the 
government. 
Second, most newspapers' sponsors are Chinese government institutions because 
they own the largest numbers of newspapers in China, and meanwhile the government 
controls the publication of listed firms' announcements. 
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Third, most reports, except the ones from government appointed publications, 
will not have great a impact on firms' stock performances because those reports are 
serve as the government's mouthpiece and merely repeat one another. 
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Chapter 4. Data and Sample Selection 
4.1 Data source 
We referred to a wide range of sources when collecting data. Totally speaking, the 
target data includes the sample firms' stock prices, records on restructuring activities, 
CEO backgrounds, accounting figures, and news reports regarding the specific firms. 
In the sample selection stage, to calculate each firm's ROE, we used accounting 
data from the dataset CSMAR (China Stock Market Accounting Research). This database 
contains complete financial data since 1990 of all companies listed in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai stock exchanges. After filtering out the samples, we determined the firms' 
specific earnings announcement dates in the sample years. This information can be 
found in the finance channel of SIN A website � . 
The third step was to search for the news reports within two months following the 
announcement date for each sample firm. China InfoBank contains the most complete 
record of Chinese companies' news. It collects and broadcasts China business 
information in a timely manner to a wide range of clients all over the world. It covers 
more than 1,000 media sources and provides raw information of 194 industries in 
China. Therefore, we can access to the news reports about a specific company directly 
via China InfoBank. 
As for the daily stock price information, which is used to calculate the CAR in 
our event studies, we refer to some online datasets, such as DaZhiHui — an 
® http://finance.sina.com.cn/. 
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information platform which provides updated stock market data in Chinese domestic 
markets to investors freely. A company's stock price data, together with the daily 
market index data, can be found dating back to 1999 with this free software. Besides, 
part of the stock price data can be directly downloaded from the CSMAR Special 
Treatment database from the GTA research service center. This database does not have 
the stock price records of all publicly traded companies. 
We mainly found detailed information on companies' restructuring activities from 
the CSMAR database. However, we also looked up the annual reports of some 
companies to determine the detailed procedures of their restructuring activities. 
Annual reports of those listed companies are open to the public and can be found on 
financial websites such as SINA. 
In addition, we referred to the "Profile of Directors and Senior Managers" 
section of the company's prospectus and the companies' annual reports to determine if 
CEOs have a governmental background. 
Lastly, as for the information regarding specific newspapers, we collected 
information on their circulation and sponsoring agents from a professional website 
called www.gotoread.com, which covers the basic information of all Chinese 
newspapers. Some circulation numbers are not revealed on this website, so we had to 
make several cold calls to their offices to ask for this information. 
4.2 Sample selection 
Basically speaking, there are two methods for selecting the 
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performance-declining group. In the corporate strategy and finance literature, an array 
of definitions has been used. Some definitions are based on changes in either raw or 
industry-adjusted accounting ratios such as return on assets, others are based on stock 
returns. One method is to select firms which were originally healthy (performance 
above industry median in previous year), but which then dropped to the industry 
bottom quartile. For example, Denis and Kruse (2000) used samples that have 
above-median industry-adjusted operation performance in one year and were followed 
by industry-adjusted operation performance in the bottom quartile of the firms with 
the same minimum size requirement the following year. Their sample selection 
standard is based on industry adjusted accounting performance such as earnings. Ofek 
(1993) defined performance decline in terms of the change in the annual stock return 
ranking of a firm among all the firms in the market from being in the top 67% in one 
year (the base year) to the bottom 10% in the distress year. This decline may range 
from a maximum of 100% to a minimum of 23%. This steep fall in value is regarded 
as sufficient to trigger various restructuring actions by the distressed firms. Thus, their 
sample selection standard is the change in stock returns rather than accounting 
earnings. 
The sample selection standard used in this paper follows Denis and Kruse (2000). 
To find out qualified samples, we first figured out the industry codes for each listed 
company in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, and then classified all the 
companies based on their industry codes. Within each industry, we calculated the 
industry's median ROE at the benchmark year and filtered out the firms with above 
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median performance. Similarly, we calculated the industry average ROE on the 
second year and selected the ones lying in the bottom quartile. Originally we focused 
on the fiscal year 2001-2002 and filtered out 19 samples only. There are several 
reasons for the small numbers of qualified samples. The first one is that some of the 
listed firms have no industry code because they were operating cross-industry 
businesses. Another reason for this is that certain industries have too few companies. 
With only two or three listed companies in an industry it is difficult to select the 
bottom quartile companies. Facing the small sample size, we tried to switch the 
selection criteria. With the new criteria, the target companies became companies 
which were top quartile industry performers in 2001, but which fell to below industry 
median a year later. However, the new criteria could not filter out many sample firms 
either. Therefore, we extended the target financial years to 1998-1999, 1999-2000， 
2000-2001 and 2002-2003. To be more specific, we first studied firms which 
published their 1998 annual financial announcements in 1999 and second year annual 
reports in 2000. Then, we extended our studies to the following years. Finally, we 
found 130 firms whose accounting performance was originally above industry median 
in the previous year but then dropped to their industry's bottom quartile. However, we 
subsequently found 11 of them had incomplete daily stock price data. Therefore, we 
deleted those 11 firms from the pool. Finally, 119 firms were included in the sample; 
detailed information of the complete sample is listed in the Appendix. 
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4.3 News collection 
For each firm in the sample we searched China InfoBank for all news containing 
the company's name after their earnings announcements within two months after the 
announcement. There are around 100 newspapers in China InfoBank's Economic 
News database. For example, if a firm's target year announcement date was March 
20出’ then we searched for news regarding this company published from March 2 ” � t o 
May 20也.To search for news of the sample 一 Shahe Industry Co., Ltd ( 沙 河 股 份 ’ stock 
code: 000014) — we first needed to know the announcement date of this company on 
2000，which was April 2 0 � \ 2000. Then, we searched for this company's news within 
two month after April 20出，2000. Please note that the sample's announcement dates 
are different from each other, so we ran individual searches for every sample 
company. 
We classified all the news into three categories: total news, headline news, and 
negative news. 
1) Definition of "negative reports": articles which explicitly mention the company's 
previous year bad earnings performance. 
2) Definition of "headline news": any article in which the company's name appears 
in the news headline. 
3) Definition of "total news": any article in which the company's name appears. The 
"total news" includes "headline news" and “negative news". 
28 
Chapter 5. Summary Statistics 
First, among the sample firms, 11 belong to petrochemicals industry, and 7 of 
them belong to metal production industry, while 17 of them belong to machinery 
production industry and 7 of them belong to real estate industry. 
We calculated the mean, median, maximum value and minimum value of the full 
sample. The mean book value of the benchmark year's total equity of the full sample 
equals around 0.9 billion Yuan. The average of the EBIT/Total Equity® ratio for the 
full sample in the first year is 60.37%. In the second year the total equity values did 
not change much, but those firms' operating incomes in the second year decreased a 
lot. The mean of their operating income decreased from 113 million to 94 million, and 
their mean ROE index fell to -6.4%. Lastly, in the third year a significant change 
happened: the operating income increased to 208 million, and the ROE increased to 
36.26%. All these results are listed in Table 1. 
We performed other summary statistics on the sample. Table 2 provides the 
summary statistics of the ROE percent change� in the second year and third year of 
the full sample. 
From these statistics, we want to mention some figures in particular. The average 
decrease in ROE in the second year was around 100%, while in the third year, their 
® EBIT stands for the earnings before interest and tax; and it is used to calculate ROE; EBIT is also known as the 
operating income of a firm. 
® ROE percent change in the second year = (second year ROE - first year ROE)/Absolute value of first year ROE 
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ROE improved a lot: the median value of ROE change in the third year was around 
36.3%. Those facts in some degree show that the sample firms experienced 
performance decline in the second year and their performances in the third year 
started to bounce back. 
As for the news report numbers about those firms, from Table 3 we noticed there 
are 64 firms in total with headline news and only 54 firms within negative news 
reports during the given duration. In addition, companies with negative news have an 
average percentage change of earnings which is just around -78.75%, but the figure 
for the samples without negative news is -120.26% on average. To some degree, this 
reflects the fact that the earnings performance decline may not be the factor leading to 
more negative reports, which challenges the logic behind our work. 
We examined sample companies' second year restructuring activities data. From 
Table 4，we can see that within one year after the earnings announcement 59 out of 
119 companies experienced some kind of restructuring activities. The largest number 
of restructuring activities for a single company is 8，while the average number of 
restructuring activities for the companies with restructuring activities is about 2.36， 
which means on average each company experienced 2.36 instances of restructuring 
activities. To be more specific, after reviewing the annual reports we found that 28 out 
of 119 sample companies chose to sell their shares for cash or change major 
shareholders. 
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We classified all the restructuring activities into 6 categories from A to F® based 
on standards provided by the CSMAR database. We found that most of the 
restructuring activities adopted Form C and D as their restructuring methods. In other 
words, they sold original assets or transferred original company shares to other parties. 
We hypothesized that this is because after the earnings decline a large proportion of 
the samples started to focus their business or to raise money by selling assets for the 
purpose of improving performance, while other companies were inclined to switch the 
controlling parties to improve internal management and other corporate governance 
mechanisms, leading to the phenomenon of transferring shares to other parties. 
Furthermore, to connect the number of restructuring activities to the number of 
negative news, we drafted the following two panels in Table 4: we compared the 
number of restructuring activities of companies with negative news to the companies 
without negative news. Furthermore, we performed a two-sample mean comparison 
test on them. We found that the number of restructuring activities of the companies 
with negative news is significantly higher than that of the companies without negative 
news®. These results imply that firms with negative news are inclined to have more 
restructuring activities than those without negative news. The detailed results are 
shown in Table 4. 
Lastly, we analyzed the CEO background data. Among the 119 samples, there are 
® A: acquiring shares of other companies; B: buying assets; C: selling assets; D: transferring original shares to 
other parties; E: Swapping assets with other companies; F: restructuring the debts 
® Parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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30 companies which had CEOs with governmental backgrounds when their second 
year annual reports were published. The percentage is 22.9%, which is a little lower 
than the results from Fan, Wang, Zhang's paper (2007) — Politically connected CEOs, 
corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially 
privatized firms 一 in which they state the percentage of politically connected CEO is 
around 27%. We followed their definition of a "politically connected CEO". 
Obviously, their definition� has several flaws: First, although some CEOs are not 
explicitly appointed as governmental officials, they are actually relatives of influential 
government officials. We believe they still possess strong protection and connection 
from the Chinese government. However, we ignore those people in our study. On the 
contrary, although some CEOs have governmental experiences in their backgrounds, 
they moved to the new positions as part of a normal job change and do not use their 
political influence, especially in cases when they resigned their governmental jobs at 
an early stage in their career. 
® They believe that if the CEO is a current or former officer of the central or local governments or the military, the 
CEO should be regarded as politically connected. 
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Chapter 6. Methodology 
6.1 Event study 
To see whether news items help to achieve market efficiency, or in other words, 
whether the media significantly influences stock prices, we applied the standard event 
study" methodology, following the methods of Brown and Warner (1980). In the 
study, the event date can be either the earnings announcement date or the news release 
dates after the official earnings announcement; this is a multi-event date case. 
6.1.1 Definition of event window 
First, we defined the event window as the period under which the stock prices of 
certain firms are closely investigated. We first examined stock prices changes on 
official corporate earnings announcement dates. The general practice is to look at the 
abnormal return over the period (-3, +3), which means from three days before the 
announcement date to three days after the announcement date. In this case, the event 
window was defined as (-3，+3). We also examined the effects of different types of 
news' effects on the stock prices. It is customary to define the event window as the 
duration starting from day 0’ which is the announcement date, to 60 and 90 post-event 
trading days; the abnormal return over these periods will be examined separately. 
6.1.2 Normal and abnormal returns 
After identifying the event, we measured the abnormal return. We defined the 
11 Event study: empirical study of the prices of an asset prior to and directly following a specific event, like an 
announcement, merger or dividend 
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abnormal return after the news. Before this, the stock return (in percentage) was 
defined as the logarithm difference between the stock closing price on day t and the 
closing price of the previous day: 
R“二 I n (P“P"_0 (1) 
where Pu is the closing price of stock i on day t. 
The abnormal returns for each listed company are expressed as follows: 
AR,=R,-E{RJX,) (2) 
AR“ ， ， s t a n d for the abnormal, actual, and normal returns 
respectively for time period t. Z, is the conditioning information for the normal 
return model. 
6.1.3 Determining the normal returns, abnormal returns and CAR 
Then, for calculating / ) , we used the market model proposed by Fama 
(1976) which assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and the 
security return. In market model, X,) ^a^+jS^R^ , where R时 stands for 
market return at time t. 
Then, to estimate a. together with；^.，we defined the estimation window. The 
most common choice is using the period prior to the event window for the estimation 
window. The market model parameters could be estimated over the 120 trading days 
prior to the event. We used -150 to trading days as the estimation window. The 
standard market model regression for stock i is: 
12 We used (-150, -30) as estimation window to avoid overlapping with the event window (-3’ +3). In addition, the 
information about earnings performance might often be leaked to the market before the official announcements, 
which means the stock prices may reflect the earnings information before the announcement dates. Therefore, the 
period (-150, -30) is better for assessing companies' normal performances. 
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代 凡 〜 (3) 
Therefore, we used OLS estimation with the stock price data of the previous 120 
trading days to get a. and . 
With the parameter estimates for the normal performance model, the abnormal 
returns can be calculated: AR.^ = 一 E{R., / X,) (4) 
Subsequently, the methods for calculating the cumulative abnormal return are 
expressed in the following way: 
CAR,=Y,AR, (5) f=i 
Which means CAR for firm i is the aggregation of abnormal return over the event 
window; T is the length of the event window. This shows the cumulative effect of 
media monitoring on a certain firm on risk adjusted stock returns during the event 
window. According to different target period, t can be set as 30, 60 or 90 days. 
Because the event dates include official earnings announcement dates, news 
release dates, and "headline news" and "negative news" release dates, we expected 
the CARs of each event to be significantly different from each other. To be more 
specific, we calculated the CARs after the earnings announcement, headline news 
release and negative news release separately. We expected that the CAR of negative 
news should be more negative than "headline news" release and the company's own 
earnings announcement. To test this, we applied one-sample mean comparison test 
and two-sample mean comparison tests to examine, firstly, whether the CAR result of 
different events are significantly different from zero, and secondly, whether the CAR 
results of different events are significantly different to one another. This procedure is 
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consistent with that of Brown and Warner (1980) and takes into account the 
cross-sectional dependence in performance measures. 
6.2 Using CAR to calculate the overall market response 
after earnings announcement 
As mentioned above, we set the event window to 30, 60 and 90 days to measure 
the overall market response after official earnings announcement. According to the 
empirical regularity well documented in the literature^^ regarding efficient market 
theory, CAR usually changes gradually until the stock price reaches the market 
equilibrium level due to some delays in reacting to earnings announcements or news 
releases. Therefore, the whole process usually takes several months. 
6.3 Measuring announcement date effects on stock 
performances 
We set the official earnings announcement date as Day 0. However, to calculate 
the effect of the earnings announcement on the stock markets, we defined day (-3, +3) 
as the event window. Then, we used the cumulative abnormal return over the period 
(-3，+3) to measure the earnings announcement effect on the stock price. This 
application is mainly used to test the effect of the earnings announcement on stock 
13 Eugene F. Fama, "Random Walks in Stock Market Prices," Financial Analysts Journal, September/October 1965 
(reprinted January-February 1995). "An 'efficient' market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of 
rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual 
securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient 
market, competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual 
prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already 
occurred and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an 
efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value." 
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prices. In addition, we gave the Abnormal Returns on Day 0 to show the market 
reactions to the earnings announcements on the announcement date. 
6.4 Measuring news effect using CAR and Statistical 
Inference 
Using the standard event study method, we easily determined the effects of 
earnings announcement by calculating the CAR from announcement date event 
window which is day -3 to the post event 3 trading days. 
However, it was slightly complicated to gauge the effect of news on stock 
performance because, in general, each firm has a certain number of news items at any 
given period of time. To clearly identify the effect of news on stock price, we invented 
one main method to calculate the effect of news on CAR. 
The method simply used the first headline news report date and the first negative 
news report date to measure the effects caused by these two kinds of news. Here, we 
assumed that the first headline news or negative news generally have a stronger 
influence on stock prices than subsequent headlines or negative news. Therefore, we 
expected to see that the CARs on the first headline news or first negative news dates 
are significantly different from zero. We looked at the abnormal return on the first 
headline news date and first negative news date, and took the average across firms. 
This practice aimed to identify the effects of headline news reports or negative news 
reports on the stock prices. The underlying assumption was that the market reacts 
most to the first headline news report and first negative news report. Finally, 
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one-sample mean comparison test together with the two-sample mean comparison test 
were applied. 
In addition to the above measurements, we calculated the CARs within the next 
10 days after the first headline or first negative news date in case that the market took 
several days to incorporate the news. In other words, we took the first headline or 
negative news dates as day 0，and then calculated the CAR between day 0 and day 10. 
We expected the CAR of those periods to differ greatly from the CAR before the first 
report date. Similarly, t-tests were also applied to test the differences of CARs of 
different periods. 
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Chapter 7. Empirical Results 
7.1 Heteroscedasticity problem of cross sectional data 
regression and multi-collinearity problem of linear 
regression 
7.1.1 Heteroscedasticity problem 
Because data used in the thesis are cross sectional data, it is a common practice to 
do heteroscedasticity test before carrying out the regression analysis. Generally 
speaking, heteroscedasticity refers to the variance of the error terms is different, that is, 
� 广 ， w h e r e ~ is the error term.. 
Heteroscedasticity has serious consequences for the OLS estimator. Although the 
OLS estimators remain unbiased, they are inefficient. Because of this, confidence 
intervals and hypotheses tests become invalid. If the form of the heteroscedasticity is 
known, it can be corrected (via appropriate transformation of the data) and the 
resulting estimators, called weighted least squares (WLS) estimators, can be obtained. 
There are several ways testing heteroscedasticity. In the thesis, we used the 
Breusch-Pagan test for testing the potential heteroscedasticity problem. This test 
assumes that the variance of the error term is a linear function of the independent 
variable in the regression. While in the test the null hypothesis assumes that the 
error terms have constant variance. In other words, 
Ho: (芒?) 二 ，constant error variance 
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To be more specific, the logic of this test is explained as follows: 
Assume we have a regression model which is specified as: 
Yi 二 Ih + Pl^X 2i + …+ PkX ki + (6) 
If there are some variables Z2，... Zp that influence the error variance and if 
var(f,) = of 二 + …+ 仅而)， （7) 
where the function 八）can be any function. 
Under such circumstances, the Breusch-Pagan test is a test of the null hypothesis: 
The Breusch-Pagan test does not depend on the functional form . Let 
沙 2 = 迷 . 
“ , w h e r e is the OLS residuals, and n is the size of the sample, and 
z Z Z ESS=regression sum of squared errors from a regression of ^ on 1’ 2’... P . 
Then SSE / l a ^ has a ^^ distribution with degrees of freedom P. This test 
is an asymptotic test. This test has been done before each linear regression took 
place. 
If any heteroscedasticity is found in the regressions, robust regression will be 
used to eliminate the problem. 
7.1.2 Multi-collinearity problem of linear regression: 
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Once the independent variables have multi-collinearity, the estimates will remain 
unbiased and the overall fit of the equation will be unaffected and the estimation of 
the variables that are not collinear will be unaffected. However, the variances of the 
estimates will increase, and at the same time computed t-scores will become very low. 
In addition, estimates will become very sensitive to changes in specification. 
Facing the above problems from multi-collinearity, an investigation of the 
multi-collinearity is needed before carrying out the regression analysis. Pairwise 
collinearity can be determined from viewing a correlation matrix of the independent 
variables. However, correlation matrices will not reveal higher order collinearity. In 
this case, variance inflation factors are one measure that can be used to detect 
multi-collinearity. 
Variance inflation factors are a scaled version of the multiple correlation 
coefficients between variable j and the rest of the independent variables. Specifically, 
仰 广 r ： ^ (8) 
Where Rj is the multiple correlation coefficient. In this model it is obtained by 
regressing Xj on the remaining independent variables. 
If Rj equals zero (i.e., no correlation between Xj and the remaining independent 
variables), then VEFj equals 1. This is the minimum value of VIFj. Neter, Wasserman, 
and Kutner (1985) recommend looking at the largest VIF value. A value greater than 
10 is an indication of potential multi-collinearity problems. Similarly, we calculated 
Variance inflation factor for each regression, and the results are reported before each 
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regression result table. 
If the multi-collinearity is severe within the independent variables, it is a common 
practice to drop certain independent variables to avoid multi-collinearity. An 
alternative for eliminating multi-collinearity problem is to enlarge the sample size. 
7.2 Overall market response after the earnings 
announcement 
We looked at the overall market response after the earnings announcements by 
calculating the short-term and long-term cumulative abnormal returns. The event 
windows here are (0’ +30)，（0，+60) and (0，+90). 
Figure 1 shows the average abnormal returns across all sample firms over the 
period (-3，+90). From this figure we noticed that for the whole sample the CAR is 
below zero until 25 post trading days, and the smallest value of CAR happens around 
day 1 and day 14. After 25 days, the CAR becomes increasingly large. This figure 
shows that the earnings announcements have sudden effects on the stock price, but the 
effects do not last long. One reason is that the stock market absorbs the negative 
earnings announcements quickly, so it reached the smallest value in the short run. And 
given the following period, many of sample companies have already taken some kinds 
of actions such as restructuring activities to improve their performances in the long 
run. Therefore, the CAR increases in the long run. 
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When we looked at the CARs results of both short-term and long-term, we found 
that the short term CARs are more negative than the long term CAR. Table 5 gives the 
daily average CAR "^^  results over the period (-3，+3), (-3，+30), (-3’ +60), (-3，+90) 
respectively. We found that only the daily average CAR around the (-3，+3) period is 
negative. The other three daily average CARs are positive. 
In addition, to see whether the CARs over different periods are significantly 
different from each other, we applied two-sample mean comparison test. From Table 6， 
we can easily figure out that the daily average CAR around the earnings 
announcement is not significantly different from the daily average CARs over the (0， 
+60) and (0，+90) periods. 
7.3 Market reaction to official earnings announcements 
We measured the market reactions to official earnings announcements events by 
calculating the cumulative abnormal return over the period from -3 trading days to +3 
trading days^^ to see the market reactions of the earnings announcements. The event 
window here was between 3 trading days before the announcement and 3 trading days 
after the announcement. 
Table 7 depicts the results of abnormal return for the short event windows. Table 
7 reports the abnormal return during the short event window of [-3, +10] days around 
Two steps are needed to calculate daily average CARs: first, we take the average of the CAR across different 
firms, through which we get the average CAR over the period (-3’ +3) and etc.; then we divide this number by 7, 
which is the number of days the CAR covers, to get the daily average CAR of the (-3’ +3) period. 
15 Day 0 is the earnings announcement date 
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the earnings announcement event. From this table, we notice that 8 out of 14 days 
have negative average abnormal return, and five days' average abnormal returns are 
significantly different from zero. The negative abnormal returns are consistent with 
our analysis: the market reacts to the bad earnings announcements. 
7.4 Market reaction to news report 一 event study 
As mentioned in Chapter 4，there are 64 sample firms with headline news reports 
within two months after the official earnings announcements. It was expected that the 
market will react strongly to the first headline news. Thus, to measure the market 
reaction to the first headline news, first, we identified the first headline news date for 
each sample, and then we calculated the abnormal returns on the first headline news 
date for the 64 sample firms. Similarly, with the same method, we researched the 
abnormal returns on the first negative news date for the 54 samples that had negative 
news during the two months after the official earnings announcements. 
Table 8 shows the average abnormal returns across the firms on the first headline 
news dates and first negative news date respectively. The results tell us that the 
average abnormal return on the first headline news dates is around -1.57%, and the 
number is 10% significantly smaller than zero. In contrast, the average abnormal 
return on the first negative news dates is just around 0.87% which is not significantly 
different from zero. 
Another method to measure the market reaction to the headline news reports and 
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the negative news reports is to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns during the 
10 day period after the first headline news date and first negative news date. It is 
accepted that the first headline news always has more influences than second headline 
news. People will always pay more attention to the company when the news is first 
disclosed than at any other time. Thus, we focused on the influence of the first 
headline and negative news only. We defined the variables-CAR_10_ headline and 
CAR—10_negative as the cumulative abnormal returns during the 10 day period after 
the first headline news date and first negative news date. We provided the daily 
average value of these two variables in Table lOA; From Table lOA, we can tell that 
the daily average CAR 10 days after the first headline news across firms is around 
-0.09%. Furthermore, 54.69% of the 64 sample firms have negative daily average 
CAR 10 days after their first headline news reports. It is surprising to find that the 
daily average CAR 10 days after the first negative news across firms is 10% 
significantly above zero, and that only 46.30% of the 54 samples have negative daily 
average CAR 10 days after the first negative headline news reports. The latter results 
contradict our theory that the market should react negatively to negative news reports. 
This maybe because that the papers publishing negative news are not influential 
enough and there may be some positive reports about the certain company at the same 
time. 
In addition, we performed a two-sample mean comparison test between these two 
variables to show whether the stock market reacted differently to these two events in 
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Table lOB. When we made comparisons between these two variables, we noticed that 
CAR_10_ headline is 10% significantly smaller than CAR_10_negative. To some 
degree it seems that the stock market reacts more strongly to headline news than to 
first negative news. Perhaps this is because headline news more easily attracts public 
attention. 
However, we noticed that some first headline news items are also the first 
negative news. Thus, to clearly differentiate negative news effects from headline news 
effects, we further eliminated news which was both headline and negative news from 
the first headline news group. Using this classification we performed the two-sample 
mean comparison test between these two new subgroups; Table 9 shows the 
comparison results. From this table, we see that the market reaction to the first 
headline news is more negative than the reaction to the first negative news at a 5% 
significance level. 
We also compared the market reaction to the news reports with the market 
reaction to the earnings announcement by completing the similar two-sample 
comparison test between them in Table lOC-R when we compare the CAR一 10_ 
headline and CAR_10_ negative to the CAR around the earnings announcement date, 
we find that the CAR around the earnings announcements is 5% significantly smaller 
than CAR_10_negative, which means the market reacts more strongly to the official 
earnings announcements than to news reports. 
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Moreover, we found there are some flaws in the above comparison method: the 
CAR (-3，+3) and CAR after first headline or negative news can still overlap. To 
clearly compare the effects of these two events on the stock market, we simply 
compared the abnormal returns on the announcement date 0 with the abnormal returns 
on the first headline news date and first negative news date. We list the results in 
Panel 13E and F: the results indicate that the abnormal returns on the announcement 
dates are 10% significantly smaller than the abnormal returns on the first negative 
news dates, which implies that the market reacts more strongly to the earnings 
announcements than the first negative news. 
7.5 Differentiate higher circulation news effects on the 
market from lower circulation news 
For each single news item we collected the name of the newspaper name which 
published the news, the circulation of the newspaper, and the sponsoring agent of the 
newspaper. Using this information, we divided the whole sample into different 
categories based on circulation or sponsor agent characteristics. It is common sense 
that newspapers with higher circulation will have stronger influence on the public 
than newspapers with lower circulation. Therefore, we tested whether the CAR of the 
news with higher circulation is significantly different from the CAR of the news with 
lower circulation. The test results are listed in Table 11. 
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We divided our samples into two subgroups based on circulation. To be more 
specific, we regarded the first negative news with circulation higher than 400,000 as 
subgroup nl and the first negative news with circulation smaller than 400,000 as 
subgroup n2. In Panel 11 A, we do a two-sample mean comparison test between the 
average CARs 10 days after the first negative news of these two subgroups. From the 
above table, we can see that the CAR of subgroup nl is 10% significantly smaller 
than the CAR of subgroup n2, which means the market reacts more strongly to 
negative news published in newspapers with higher circulation than those published 
in papers with lower circulations. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that 
higher circulation leads to stronger influence to the public. However, we cannot see 
the same pattern in the Table 11 A, in which the market reaction to the higher 
circulation headline news is not significantly different from the reaction to the lower 
circulation headline news. 
7.6 Differentiate regional publications news effects on 
the market from national publications news 
Similar to the method used in 7.4，we divided the first headline news into two 
categories: regional news and national news. Regional news is news published in 
regional publications such as Sichuan Daily; national news is defined as news 
published in national publications like Economic Daily. The results are listed in Table 
12. 
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From this table we can see that on average the market reacts more strongly to 
national news than regional news. However the results are not significant. We feel that 
the wider circulation of news does not necessarily lead to a stronger influence on the 
market. 
7.7 Relationship between the number of news items and 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
To ascertain whether the abnormal return patterns of listed companies are 
distinguishable based on their media coverage about their earnings, two cross 
sectional regressions are performed here: 
The first model contains the independent variables like dummy一news ！巴, 
dummy一headlinenews�7 and dummyjiegativenews^^. The whole equation is shown as 
follows: 
CM^ +b人dbm^ 一 人dmr^ 一 headinenevis)+dXdam^ _mgaivenev\s)+ 
J0percentage)+gi(asset)+hfievemge)^CED_dmr^)+jfirieivctionJiead—mgc0+ei 
(9) 
Among them, the variable: interaction一head一nega is the interaction term between 
"dummy—negativenews” and "dummy_headlinenews". “CEO一dummy” equals 1 if the 
company's CEO has a governmental background. “ A^ percentage" refers to the 
this variable equals 1 if there was any news reports regarding the sample company within two months after the 
announcement date 
17 this variable equals 1 if there was any headlines news about the sample company 
18 this variable equals 1 if there was any negative news about the sample company 
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percentage change on firms' ROE. A robust test is used here. 
Table 13 summarizes the regression results with CAR_60 and CAR—90 as 
dependent variable respectively. We find that no variable in this regression 
significantly influences CAR一60，while the interaction term- intemction一head一nega 
has a positive effect which is significant at the 10% level on the 90 days' CAR after 
the earnings announcement. 
Besides, we noticed that the independent variables dummy_news and 
dummy一negative have negative coefficients in both of the regressions, which means 
the samples with news or negative news tend to have lower CARs. 
On the other hand, the second regression model uses the number of news as one 
of the main independent variables. The theoretical equation is listed as follows: 
CAR. = a. + b. (NEWSi ) + percentage^) + d^ (asset^) + /；. {leverage^ ) + g. {CEO 一 dummy.) + e. 
(10) 
Where NEWS�=the number of news reports about firm i’s yearly earnings. 
• percentage = percentage change in the specific firm's ROE. 
assets log of total assets of the specific firm. This variable stands for the firm 
size. 
leverage =refers to the leverage ratio of the specific firm. Leverage ratio equals to 
equity/debt. 
CEO一dummy=l when the company's CEO is politically connected^^. 
The CEO is regarded as political connected if the CEO is a former officer in Chinese governments or army. This 
definition is followed Joseph P. H. Fan; T.J. Wong; Tianyu Zhang, (2006). 
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Among them，口厂饥肪吨〜ig asset ^ CEO-dummy and are control 
variables for this regression. And CAR can be CAR_60 or CAR—90. 
Table 14 gives the regression results with CAR_60 and CAR—90 as dependent 
variables respectively. 
From Table 14，we find that the coefficients for this variable in all regressions are 
negative with 1% significance level, which implies that the companies with negative 
ROE change would probably have positive cumulative abnormal return after the 
earnings announcements. This result is totally the opposite of what the theory expects. 
In a normal situation, we expect that a negative ROE will lead to a decreased CAR. 
In Table 14 we use the number of news as the main explanatory variable instead 
of dummy variable. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficients of the 
variable-number of news are positive. Furthermore, the variable- change of 
roe一percentage plays a significant role in the regression. 
7.8 Relationship between “news influence coefficient�。，， 
and Cumulative Abnormal Return: 
Here, we introduce a new variable called "news influence coefficient" to better 
20 "News influence coefficient" is the variable not only considering the number of news but also taking the 
newspapers circulation into account. This variable of each company is calculated by adding up the circulations of 
all the news of each sample, and then divide the number by 10000 to get the standardized "news influence 
coefficient". 
50 
reflect the news influential power. For each company, different newspapers with 
different circulation size have news reports. We divided the circulation number of 
each newspaper with reports by 10000 and added them to get the "news influence 
coefficient". We found that the variable-number of news can not fully stand for the 
media coverage because different newspapers have different circulation and thereby 
different influential power. Therefore, we took the newspapers' circulation into 
consideration. To be more specific, we assumed that two companies could have the 
same number of headline news items, but one company's news was all published in 
publications with high circulation, while another company's news were published in 
newspapers with lower circulation. Thus, although they have the same number of 
headline news, there are reasons for us to believe that the first company's news have 
stronger influence on the cumulative abnormal return than the second company. 
Another new variable introduced here is the “go\^emment—control" variable. We 
found that a great number of publications are actually controlled by the Chinese 
government. Therefore, we doubt that the news from those publications are objective 
and thereby have little effect on the monitoring of the performance of listed 
companies. Therefore, to find out how much influence governmental publications 
have on the CAR, we introduced the variable “government-Control” in the new 
regression. This variable ranges from 0 to 1. “1” stands for all the news for a single 
company being from newspaper controlled by the government; the higher this 
variable is, the higher degree of governmental control this company's news reports are 
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subject to. In all, this variable stands for the proportion of news reported in 
government-controlled newspapers. We expected this variable to have positive 
correlation with CAR. 
Our main explanatory variables are firms' accounting performance together with 
their media coverage. We also identified some control variables that also affect the 
firm's performance, such as log of asset, CEO-background dummy, etc. Table 15 
shows the regression results after we incorporate the new explanatory variables into 
the regression in which the dependent variable is still the CAR_60 or CAR_90. 
From Table 15，we find that the explanatory variable "negative news influence 
coefficient" has negative coefficient in the regressions, which means the stock market 
reacts negatively to the negative news. However, this result is not significant. The 
"headline news influence coefficient" has positive coefficient in the regressions, and it 
is not significant either. The only significant explanatory variable is the change of 
ROE—percentage. The coefficient for this variable is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. 
7.9 Relationship between “news influence coefficient", 
CAR, and number of restructuring activities in the 
second year 
The second part of the regression study is to determine the effects of media 
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coverage and the performance of firm on corporate restructuring activities. Generally 
speaking, when a firm experiences dramatic revenue fall, they tend to adopt some 
kind of restructuring activity to improve the company's situation. Therefore, it was 
expected that the variable-ROE percentage change will have negative correlation with 
the number of restructuring activities of a single firm. Similarly, higher circulation of 
news should lead to a bigger "news influence coefficient", meanwhile results in more 
close monitoring of the firms' corporate governance from the public. Hence, it is 
believed that a bigger "news influence coefficient" will indirectly lead to a larger 
number of restructuring activities for a single firm. 
For the regression analysis, the dependent variable is count variable which stands 
for the frequency of the restructuring activities for a single company. We applied 
Poisson regression here. The independent variables include CAR一60 or CAR—90’ 
"news influence coefficient" and the ROE percentage change. Among them, the 
variable-ROE percentage change should have negative correlation with the number of 
restructuring activities, while CARs should also have negative correlation with the 
number of restructuring activities. We list the regression results in Table 16. 
From this table, we can tell that the number of news together with the “news 
influence coefficients" do not have significant effects on the number of restructuring 
activities, while in contrast, the ydjidblQ-'govemmentjoontrol “ has significant 
positive effects on the number of restructuring activities. These above results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that news reports do not play a significant role of 
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influencing CAR and that governmental background of those newspapers pushed the 
restructuring activities a lot. Lastly, among all the control variables, we found that 
change of ROE has positive effect which is at 1% significance level on the number of 
restructuring activities, which implies that the bigger the ROE change, the more likely 
that the firms will adopt restructuring activities. This result contradicts our original 
assumption that firms experiencing performance decline are more willing to adopt 
restructuring activities as one method to improve their accounting performance. 
7.10 Relationship between the number of restructuring 
activities, CAR, different news influence coefficient, and 
the third year ROE change. 
After companies adopt some kind of restructuring activity, it is expected that their 
performance should improved in the third year due to those restructuring activities. 
The returns from stock market in the second year also have impacts on the third year's 
ROE performance of a single firm. 
This time, the dependent variable is the third year ROE percentage change^\ 
while the independent variables include the number of restructuring activities during 
the second year, CAR value in the second year, number of total news or “news 
influence coefficient", and other control variables. The results are shown in Table 17. 
21 It equals to (third year ROE - second year ROE) / absolute value of second year ROE 
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From this table, we can see that the coefficient for the number of restructuring 
activities during the second year is positive, but the coefficient in this table is not 
significant. 
Overall, from the above evidence, it is difficult to conclude that the news reports 
play an important role in the stock market and corporate governance, because we keep 
getting contradicting results throughout the whole study. Furthermore, there is no 
strong evidence that the stock market reacts obviously to news reports. Those results 
support the hypotheses in Chapter 3, which are derived from the descriptions about 
Chinese media system and institutional settings. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
The Chinese media is expected to play an important role in monitoring the 
accounting performance and corporate governance of listed firms as part of its larger 
role of monitoring the stock market. Our aim was to determine whether the media has 
strong effect on the stock market. To realize this, we collected information about the 
news reports for each company in the sample within two months after their earnings 
announcement. We recorded the number of news released about the specific firms 
during the given periods; in the meantime, we examined in detail the newspapers' 
circulations and the sponsoring agents' characteristics, such as whether the newspaper 
is controlled by government or not. Through this process, we found that 64 and 54 
firms out of 119 have headline news and negative news within the given time. 
Although all the companies experienced dramatic performance decline in the previous 
year, more than half of them were not subject to any negative reports from the media. 
Therefore, to some degree, the media did not fulfill its monitoring duties in regards to 
all companies. The possible reasons for this phenomenon have already been discussed 
in Chapter 3: newspapers are not willing the reveal the negative sides of the listed 
companies because, first, they get economic benefits from those companies, and 
second, those companies receive special protection from the government, which 
actually controls most of the financial media in China. In addition, sometimes adverse 
selection happens to news reports. As mouthpieces for the local and national 
governments, Chinese newspapers are used to helping companies with problematic 
performances by reporting or emphasizing the positive sides of the firms rather than 
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the negative sides. All of the above reasons lead to the limited number of negative 
reports about the companies' accounting performances. 
Furthermore, we found that most of the headline news and the negative news are 
published in government-controlled publications. This result is not surprising, because 
as we state all the Chinese publications belong to Chinese government from the 
founding of People's Republic of China. 
The most important part of our study was to examine the effect of news reports 
stock market price and corporate governance via event study and regression analysis. 
We found that the market reacts little to negative news reports in most cases and 
always reacts positively to headline news. This may be because a large amount of 
headline news is not negative at all and consequently the headline news has positive 
effects on the stock market. In addition, we found that the market reacts more strongly 
to the companies' earnings announcements rather than their headline or negative news, 
by calculating the abnormal returns on announcement dates and news releasing dates. 
Furthermore, regression analysis does not provide strong evidence that the news 
reports have obvious effects on CAR and restructuring activities. This result in some 
degree reflects that the news reports have a quite limited impact on the stock market 
and their monitoring duties are not fully realized. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics on Basic Information of the Sample 
Benchmark Year Second year Third year 
Total Operating Total Operating Total Operating 
Equity Income ROE Equity Income ROE Equity income ROE 
(RMB (RMB (%) (RMB (RMB (%) (RMB (RMB (%) 
Billion) Billion) Bn) Bn) Bn) Bn) 
Mean 0.93 0.11 60.37 0.94 0.094 6.44 0.88 0.21 36.26 
Median 0.53 0.07 11.03 0.54 0.051 9.06 0.52 0.10 21.77 
Max 13.2 1.55 6154.7 12.9 1.57 19.08 11.00 3.16 667.05 
Min -1.53 -0.03 97.7 -0.97 -0.16 -1271.09 -0.05 -0.11 9.81 
This gives the mean, median, maximum and minimum value of the sample companies' total 
equity, operating income, and ROE change in the benchmark year, second year, and third 
year. 
Table 2 Summary Statistics on ROE Change 
Second Year ROE Percentage Change Third Year ROE Percentage Change 
Min -1.011 -0.102 
Mean -0.610 0.036 
Max 0.003 7.834 
This lists the mean, minimum and maximum value of sample companies' second and third 
year ROE percentage change. 
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Table 3 Two-sample Mean Comparison Test of the Earnings Performance Between 
the Subgroup with Negative News and the Subgroup Without Negative News 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Subgroup with negative news 54 -78.75% 31.03% 
Subgroup without negative news 65 -120.26% 435.75% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 半 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.775 p=0.450 p=0.225 
This lists the comparison test of the ROEs between the subgroup with negative news and the 
subgroup without negative news. There are 54 samples of companies with negative news; the 
remaining 65 companies do not have negative news during the observed period. Through this 
test, we do not find significance of the difference in these two populations. 
In this table, the null hypothesis-Ho assumes the difference in two populations means equals zero. 
And "Ha: diff * 0” means the alternative hypothesis that the difference in the two populations' 
means is not zero. 
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Table 4 Statistics about the number of restructuring activities of the companies with 
negative news 
Panel A Number of Restructuring Activities of Different Sub-samples 
Number of Companies With Number of Total Restructuring 
Restructuring Activities Activities 
Whole Sample (119) ^ 
Companies With 如 贴 
Negative News (54) 
Companies Without 沾 ^^ 
Negative News (65) 
This compares the number of restructuring activities of different sub-samples. There are 59 
companies experiencing some kinds of restructurings, and they had 139 restructuring 
activities in total. Among the companies with negative news, there are 20 companies 
experiencing 48 restructuring activities. Among the companies without negative news there 
are 39 companies experiencing 91 restructuring activities. 
Panel B Two-sample mean comparison test of the number of restructuring activities between the 
subgroup with negative news and the subgroup without negative news 
Variable O ^ Mean Std.Dev 
Subgroup With Negative Mews" 54 L39 1.73 
Subgroup Without Negative News'' 65 1.00 1.51 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff ？^  0 Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.8989 p=0.2022 p=0.1011 
From this table we can see that the subgroup with negative news experiences more restructuring 
activities on average than the subgroup without negative news. However, the test results are not 
significant. There are 54 samples having negative news and the rest 65 companies in the sample 
(119 in total) do not have negative news during the observing period. 
In addition, the null hypothesis in this table-Ho assumes the difference in two populatioms' means 
equals zero. Furthermore, "Ha: diff^^O" means the alternative hypothesis that the difference in the 
two populations' means are not zero. 
a Stands for samples with negative news reports within two months after the earnings 
announcements. 
b Stands for samples without negative news reports within two months after the earnings 
announcement. 
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Table 5 Daily Average CAR over Different Periods 
Type of Event 
Official Announcement-dates" 119 
Average CARb -0.17% 
t-Statistics° -0.9149 
Percentage of Negative CAR 54.62% 
30 Days After Announcement 119 
Average CAR 0.49% 
t-Statistics 0.8601 
Percentage of Negative CAR 52.94% 
60 Days After Announcement 119 
Average C A R � 0.06% 
t-Statistics 1.6472* 
Percentage of Negative CAR 46.22% 
90 Days After Announcement 
Average CAR" 0.05% 
t-Statistics 1.8529* 
Percentage of Negative CAR 45.38% 
Note: (*) Significant at the 10% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (***) Significant at the 1% 
level. 
This lists the daily average CAR value on different periods: on the announcement dates, 
during 30, 60，and 90 days after the announcements for all the samples. 
a Date refers to the official earnings announcement date for each sample, 
b Average CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return over the (-3,+3) event period, 
c t-statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the average CAR associated with an 
announcement is zero. 
d Average CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return over the (-3 ,+60) event period. 
° Average CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return over the (-3,+90) event period. 
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Table 6 Two-sample Mean Comparison Test 
Panel 6A; average—CAR(-3，+3) and average—CAR(-3，60) 
Variable O ^ Mean Std. Dev 
average_CAR(-3，+3)- 119 -0.17% 2.07% 
average 一 CAR(-3,60)b 119 0.06% 0.41% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 半 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.8873 p=0.2254 p=0.1127 
Panel 6B; average_CAR(-3,+3) and average—CAR(-3，90) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
average_CAR(-3,+3) 119 -0.17% 2.07% 
average_CAR(-3’90)c 119 0.05% 0.30% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 丰 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p== 0.1211 p=0.2423 p=0.8789 
Panel 6C; average一CAR(-3，+60) and average一CAR(-3，90) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
average_CAR(-3,60) 119 0.06% 0.41% 
average_CAR(-3,90) 119 0.05% 0.30% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff • 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.5872 p=0.8255 p=0.4128 
This compares short-term CAR value with the long term CAR value after the earnings 
announcements over different durations of all samples. From the comparisons, we could not find 
significant differences between daily average CAR value with different durations. 
In these tables, the null hypothesis-Ho assumes the difference in two populations' means equals 
zero. “Ha: diff 丰 0" means the alternative hypothesis that the difference in the two populations' 
means is not zero. 
a Value is calculated by taking average of the CAR over the period 3 days before the 
announcement to the 3 days after the announcement across all the samples, 
b Value is calculated by taking average of the CAR over the period 3 days before the 
announcement to the 60 days after the announcement across all the samples, 
c Value is calculated by taking average of the CAR over the period 3 days before the 
announcement to the 90 days after the announcement across all the samples. 
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Table 7 Average Abnormal Returns from 3 Days Before Announcement to 10 
Days After Announcement 
Date Average Abnormal Return® t-statistics 
-3 0.0023 1.096 
-2 -0.0020 -0.998 
-1 0.0042 1.9768 
0 -0.0216 -1.7196 
1 0.0009 0.4318 
2 -0.0005 -0.216 
3 0.0045 2.0026 
4 0.0000 -0.0071 
5 0.0028 1.1274 
6 0.0043 1.5914 
7 -0.0005 -0.2721 
8 -0.0030 -1.4187 
9 -0.0018 -0.8044 
10 -0.0006 -0.2601 
This lists the average abnormal returns across samples from 3 days before the announcements 
to 10 days after the announcements. 
a Value is calculated by take the average of abnormal returns on day (-3) to day (+10) across all 
samples 
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Table 8 Abnormal Returns on the First Headline News Date and First Negative 
News Date 
Abnormal Return on first headline news date 64 
Average AR" -1.57% 
t-Statistics -1.2505* 
Percentage of negative AR 53.13% 
Abnormal Return on first negative news date 54 
Average AR^ 0.87% 
t-Statistics 0.6020 
Percentage of negative AR 52.83% 
This gives the average abnormal return on first headline news date and first negative news date. 
Among the 119 samples, 64 sample companies have headline news and 53.13% of these 64 
companies have negative abnormal returns on their first headline news dates. Meanwhile, there 
are 54 sample companies with negative news; 52.83% of these 54 sample companies have 
negative abnormal returns on their first negative news dates. 
a Variable is calculated by taking average of abnormal returns on the first headline news date across 
the firms. 




Table 9 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 10 Days After the First Headline News and 
First Negative News in a Clean Comparison 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Negative Without Headline" 19 1.78% 5.39% 
Headline Without Negative" 28 -3.71% 14.91% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 0 Ha: diff > 0 
P=0.9587 p=0.0827 p=0.0413 
This compares the cumulative abnormal returns 10 days after the first headline news with the 
CAR 10 days after the first negative news. To avoid the two sample's intersection, we only 
selected sample companies with a single type of news: either negative news or headline news. In 
the sample, there are 19 companies with only negative news. On the other hand, there are 28 
companies with only headline news. 
In this table, the null hypothesis-Ho assumes the difference in two populations' means equals zero. 
"Ha: diff 丰 0" means the alternative hypothesis that the difference in the two populations' means is not 
zero. 
a First negative news excludes the news which is also headline news, 
b First headline news excludes the news which is also negative news. 
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Table 10 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 10 Days After the First Headline News 
and First Negative News 
Panel lOA Cumulative Abnormal Returns 10 Days After the First Headline News and First 
Negative News 
NO. of samples 64 
Average CAR 10 days after the first headline news -0.09% 
t-Statistics -0.5372 
Percentage of negative CAR 54.69% 
NO. of samples 54 
Average CAR 10 days after the first negative news 0.25% 
t-Statistics 1.6258* 
Percentage of negative CAR 46.30% 
This gives the CAR value during the 10 days after first headline news and first negative news. 
Among the 119 samples, 64 sample companies have headline news, while 54 sample companies 丨  
have negative news. 
Panel lOB to Panel lOD Compare cumulative abnormal returns 10 days after the first headline ；| 
news and first negative news, and the short term cumulative abnormal return after the earnings ; 
announcement. 
Panel lOB; CAR 10 after first negative and CAR 10 after first headline 
Variable O ^ Mean Std. Dev 
CAR 10 after first negative 54 2.53% 11.17% i 
CAR 10 after first headline 64 -0.96% 13.95% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.9329 p=0.1343 p=0.0671 
This compares the cumulative abnormal returns during 10 days after the 
first headline news with the CAR during 10 days after the first negative 
news. Among the 119 samples, 64 sample companies have headline news, 
while 54 sample companies have negative news. 
Panel IOC; average CAR(-3,+3)*10 and CAR 10 after first headline 
Variable O ^ Mean Std. Dev 
average CAR(-3,+3)*10 119 -1.73% 20.67% 
CAR 10 after first headline 64 -0.96% 13.95% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: d i f f . 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.3819 p=0.7637 p= 0.6181 
This compares the cumulative abnormal returns during 10 days after the 
first headline news with the average CAR value from -3 to +3 day period 
of all samples. To make them comparable, we multiple 10 times the 
average CAR (-3, +3) value. Among the 119 samples, 64 sample 
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companies have headline news. 
Panel lOD; average CAR(-3，+3)*10 and CAR 10 after first negative 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
average CAR(-3，+3)*10 119 -1.73% 20.67% 
CAR 10 after first negative 54 2.53% 11.17% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: d i f f . 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.0405 p=0.0810 p=0.9595 
This compares the cumulative abnormal returns during 10 days after the 
first negative news with the average CAR value from -3 to +3 day of all 
samples. To make them comparable, we multiple 10 times the average CAR 
(-3’ +3) value. Among the 119 samples, 54 sample companies have negative 
news. 
Panel lOE to Panel lOF compare the abnormal returns on the announcement dates with the 
abnormal returns on the first negative news dates and first headline news dates. 
Panel lOE; Abnormal Returns on Announcement Dates and First Headline News Date 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Abnormal Return on Announcement Date 119 -2.16% 13.70% 
Abnormal Return on First Headline Date 64 -1.57% 9.99% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.3712 p= 0.7424 p= 0.6288 
Among the 119 samples, 64 sample companies have headline news. 
Panel lOF; Abnormal Returns on Announcement Dates and First Negative News Date 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Abnormal Return on Announcement Date 119 -2.16% 13.70% 
Abnormal Return on First Negative News Date 54 0.87% 10.46% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 丰 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p= 0.0577 p= 0.1155 p= 0.9423 
Among the 119 samples, 54 sample companies have negative news. 
In the above tables, Panel lOE and Panel lOF, the null hypothesis-Ho assumes the difference in two 
populations' means equals zero. "Ha: diff 丰 0" means the alternative hypothesis that the difference in 
the two populations' means is not zero. 
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Table 11 Comparisons of the CAR Between Higher and Lower Circulation News 
Panel l l A ; average CAR of Subgroup hi and Average CAR of Subgroup h2 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Average CAR 10 of the Subgroup hi" 16 2.04% .0971069 
Average CAR 10 of the Subgroup h2b 48 -2.19% .151304 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p= 0.8986 p= 0.2027 p= 0.1014 
This compares the 10 days CAR value of subgroup hi and h2 to examine whether the newspaper's 
circulation plays an important role in influencing CAR. In the sample, there are 16 companies' 
first headline news with circulation larger than 400000 and 48 companies' first headline news with 
circulation smaller than 400000. The comparison results are not significant. Therefore, we could 
not conclude that first headline news published in newspapers with higher circulation will have a 
stronger influence on CAR. 
In this table, the null hypothesis-Ho assumes the difference in two populations' means equals zero. 
“Ha: diff 0" means the alternative hypothesis that the difference in the two populations' means is 
not zero. 
a Subgroup hi stands for the first headline news with circulation larger than 400000. 
b Subgroup h2 stands for the first headline news with circulation smaller than 400000. 
Panel IIB; Average CAR of Subgroup nl and Average CAR of Subgroup n2 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Average CAR 10 of the subgroup nl" 10 -1.49% .0719643 
Average CAR 10 of the subgroup 44 3.47% .1189787 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 丰 0 Ha: diff > 0 
p= 0.0515 p= 0.1031 p= 0.9485 
Similarly, the second table compares the 10 days CAR value of subgroups nl and n2 to examine 
whether a newspaper's circulation plays an important role in influencing CAR. This time the 
results are significant, which means the first negative news published in higher circulated 
newspapers will affect the market more. 
In this table, the null hypothesis-Ho assumes the difference in two populations' means equals zero. 
“Ha: diff 关 0" means the alternative hypothesis that the difference in the two populations' means is 
not zero. 
a Subgroup nl stands for the first negative news with circulation larger than 400000. 
b Subgroup n2 stands for the first negative news with circulation smaller than 400000 
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Table 12 Comparisons of CAR Between Regional and National First Headline 
News 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Regional" 9 -0.13% 7.90% 
National^ 55 -1.52% 14.16% 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 丰 Q Ha: diff > 0 
p=0.6634 p= 0.6733 p= 0.3366 
This shows whether national publications have a greater impact on the stock market. There are 64 
samples with first headline news, of which 9 first headline news were published in regional 
publications, while the rest 55 first headline news were published in national newspapers. Lastly, 
there is no significance in the results. 
The null hypothesis-Ho assumes the difference in two populations' means equals zero. And "Ha: 
diff 丰 0" means the alternative hypothesis that the difference in the two populations' means is not 
zero. 
a Regional news stands for news published in the regional publications such as Sichuan Daily 
b National news stands for news published in the national publications like Economic Daily. 
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Table 13 Linear Regression Results With Dummy Variables 
Firstly, we did VEF tests for the following regressions to examine the multi-collinearity: 
^ ^ i a b l e VIF l/YW 
Interaction_headlmenegative 3.95 0.25 
dummy一negativenews 3.00 0.33 
dummy_headlinenews 2.26 0.44 
dummy一news 1.60 0.63 
Iog_asset 1.20 0.83 
leverage 1.17 0.85 
ROE 一 change 1.15 0.87 
CEO background 1.13 0.88 
Mean VIF 
So there is no multi-collinearity in the regression. 
Then BP tests were used to examine heteroskedasticity: the null hypothesis for the following tests 
are there is no heteroskedasticity in the regressions. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model A 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 (1) =2.29 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1300 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model B 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 (1) =2.34 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1257 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model C 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 (1) =1.44 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2308 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model D 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 (1) =1.49 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2217 
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Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model E 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 (1) =1.26 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2614 
From above tests results, we could conclude that no heteroskedasticity problem is detected in the 
following regressions. 
P 113A Linear Regression Results With Dummy Variables 
Dependent Variables: CAR一60 
Explanatory Variables: Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
Constant 0.0868 0.0871 0.0678 -0.4212 -0.3851 
(-0.0809) (0.0814) (0.0946) (0.5034) (0.5087) 
dummy_news" -0.0597 -0.0594 -0.0447 -0.0748 -0.0755 
(0.0940) (0.0971) (0.1058) (0.1069 (0.1071) 
dummyjieadlinenewsb 0.0220 0.0219 0.0220 0.0239 0.0212 
(0.0694) (0.0692) (0.0695) (0.0690) (0.0684) 
dummy_negativenews' -0.0885 -0.0888 -0.0884 -0.0865 -0.0907 
(0.0676) (0.0697) (0.0700) (0.0682) (0.0692) 
interaction_headline_negatived o . i i 9 2 0.1192 0.1189 0.1124 0.1176 
(0.0970) (0.0974) (0.0978) (0.0979) (0.0961) 
Leverage -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0016 
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0105) 
Change of ROE -0.0042 -0.0047 -0.0043 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) 




Number of Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
R-square 0.0353 0.0353 0.0376 0.0474 0.0484 
Here, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns during 60 days 
after the announcement. The explanatory variables in Model A are the dummy 
variables indicating whether the sample companies had news reports, headline 
news reports or negative news reports within the given period. In a word, this 
explore whether the fact that the company has received media attention impacts 
their stock price performance. In Model B to E we add control variables into the 
stepwise regression These control variables include companies' leverage ratios, 
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percentage change of ROE, companies' asset scale and the dummy variable 
indicating their CEO's governmental background. 
a Equals to 1 if there was any news reports regarding the sample company within two months after 
the announcement date. 
b Equals to 1 if there was any headlines news about the sample company, 
e Equals to 1 if there was any negative news about the sample company, 
d Interaction term between “dummy—negativenews，’ and "dummy_headlmenews". 
Panel 13B 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model A 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car—90 
chi2 (1) =1.58 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2090 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model B 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car_90 
chi2 (1) =0.42 
Prob > chi2= 0.5154 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model C 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car—90 
chi2 (1) =0.20 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6538 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model D 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car一90 
chi2 (1) =0.07 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7923 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model E 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car_90 
chi2 (1) =0.07 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7911 
From above tests results, we could conclude that no heteroskedasticity problem is detected in the 
following regressions. 
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p 11 犯 Linear Regression Results With Dummy Variables 
Dependent Variables; CAR—90 
Explanatory Variables: Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
Constant 0.1629** 0.1473* 0.1229 -0.1459 -0.1513 
(0.0779) (0.0780) (0.0870) (0.5886) (0.5891) 
dummy—news -0.1109 -0.1238 -0.1052 -0.1217 -0.1216 
(0.0988) (0.0978) (0.1032) (0.1070) (0.1073) 
dummy 一 h e a d l i n e n e w s -0.0370 -0.0321 -0.0319 -0.0309 -0.0305 
(0.0776) (0.0758) (0.0761) (0.0760) (0.0750) 
dummy_negativenews -0.1088 -0.0953 -0.0948 -0.0938 -0.0931 
(0.0789) (0.0799) (0.0803) (0.0797) (0.0801) 
interaction_headline_negative" o. l896* 0.1892°° 0.1888° 0.1853 口 0,1845口 
(0.1066) (0.1069) (0.1073) (0.1079) (0.1058) 
Leverage 0.0102 0.0113 0.0102 0.0102 
(0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0114) 
-0.0053 -0.0056 -0.0056 
change of ROE_percentage „ �，、 
- P S (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0034) 




Number of Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
R-square 0.0495 0.0545 0.0576 0.0601 0.0601 
Note: (*) Significant at the 10% level. (•*) Significant at the 5% level. (***) Significant at the 1% 
level. 
Here, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns during 90 days after the 
announcement. The explanatory variables in Model A are the dummy variables indicating 
whether the sample companies had news reports, headline news reports or negative news reports 
within the given period. In a word, we explore whether the fact that the company has news 
reports gave impacts their stock price performance. In Model B to E we add control variables into 
the regression step by step. These control variables include companies' leverage ratios, 
percentage change of ROE, the companies' asset scale and the dummy variable indicating their 
CEO's governmental background. 
a Interaction term of the dummy_headlmenews and dummy—negative news. 
75 
Table 14 Linear Regression Results with Number of News Items 
Panel 14A: Linear Regression Results with Number of News Items 
Dependent Variable: CAR一60 
Firstly, we did VIF tests for the following regressions to examine the multi-collinearity: 
t r i a b l e VIF 1/VIF 
Iog_asset 1.14 0.88 
leverage 1.05 0.95 
ROE_change 1.07 0.94 
CEO background 1.06 0.94 
"^eanVIF 1.08 
So there is no multi-collinearity in the regression. 
Then BP tests were used to examine heteroskedasticity: the null hypothesis for the following tests 
are there is no heteroskedasticity in the regressions. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model A 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 (1) =0.24 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6207 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model B 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 (1) =0.53 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4669 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model C 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 (1) =3.68 
Prob >chi2 = 0.0551 
From above tests results, we could conclude that no heteroskedasticity problem is detected in the 
following regressions except in Model C, so robust tests are used for them. 
Explanatory Variables: Model A Model B Model C 
Constant -0.3736 -0.1602 -1 .1231* 
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0.4979 0.6347 0.6572 
Number of News 0.0012 
0.0032 
Number of Headline News 0.0032 
0.0086 
0.0152 
Number of Negative News 
0.0208 
change of ROE_percentage - 0 . 0 0 6 7 * * * -0.0066 - 0 . 0 0 9 1 * * * 
0.0020 0.0025 0.0024 
Asset 0.0194 0.0085 0 . 0 5 5 1 * * 
0.0243 0.0305 
CEO_background -0.0030 0.0267 -0.0507 
0.0598 0.0735 0.0860 
Leverage -0.0017 0 .0014* -0.0116 
0.0102 0.0148 0.0138 
Number of Observations 119 119 119 
R-square 0.0145 0.0095 0.0788 
Panel 14B: Linear Regression Results with Number of News Items 
Dependent variables: CAR—90 
BP tests were used to examine heteroskedasticity: the null hypothesis for the following tests are there 
is no heteroskedasticity in the regressions. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model A 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car一90 
chi2 (1) =0.03 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8739 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model B 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car_90 
chi2 (1) =0.31 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5798 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model C 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car一90 
chi2 (1) =0.18 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6720 
From above tests results, we could conclude that no heteroskedasticity problem is detected in the 
following regressions. 
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Explanatory Variables: Model A Model B Model C 
Constant -0.1029 0.0622 -0.7815 
0.5806 0.6951 0.6710 
Number of News 0.0025 * * * 
0.0044 
Number of Headline News 0 .0019* * 
0.0090 
0.0009 
Number of Negative News 0.0193 
change of ROE_percentage -0.0098 -0.00916 - 0 . 0 0 9 0 * * * 
0.0035 0.0038 0.0024 
Asset 0.0049 -0.00269 0.0392 
0.0283 0.0334 0.0333 
CEO_background 0.0299 0.080413 0.0155 
0.0648 0.0766 0.1010 
Leverage 0.0089 0.006512 -0.0038 
0.0112 0.0174 0.0161 
Number of Observations 119 119 119 
R-square 0.0199 0.0247 0.032 
Note: (*) Significant at the 10% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (***) Significant at the 1% 
level. 
In the above two tables, the dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal returns during 60 
and 90 days respectively. The explanatory variables are the number of total news, headline news 
reports and negative news reports within the given period. We also put control variables into the 
regression step by step. These control variables include companies' leverage ratios, percentage 




Table 15 Linear Regression Results With “news influence coefficient" 
Firstly，we did VIF tests for the following regressions to examine the multi-collinearity: 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
log_asset 1.14 0.88 
leverage 1.09 0.92 
ROE—change 1.07 0.93 
CEO background 1.06 0.94 
news_govern_coefficient_head 1.21 0.83 
newsinfluency.head 1.17 0.86 
Mean VIF 
So there is no multi-collinearity in the regression. 
Then BP tests were used to examine heteroskedasticity: the null hypothesis for the following tests 
are there is no heteroskedasticity in the regressions except Model B and H, so robust tests are used 
for them. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model B 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 = 8.47 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0036 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model C 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 = 1.47 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2250 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model D 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 = 1.30 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2548 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model E 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 = 0.49 
Prob >chi2 = 0.4819 
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Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model F 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 = 0.06 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8106 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model G 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 = 2.46 
Prob >chi2 = 0.1169 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model H 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car60 
chi2 = 4.16 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0414 
Linear Regression Results With "news Influence Coefficient" Panel ISA Dependent Variables: CAR一60 
Explanatory Variables; Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
Constant -0.0111 0.2115 0.2115 -0.0563 -0.1461 -0.0080 -0.3673 
(0.0309) (0.1415) (0.1421) (0.5259) (0.5410) (0.0308) (0.4883) 
newsinfluency.head" 0.0030 0.0030 
(0.0760) (0.0036) 
news_govern_coefficient_head' Q 0763 
(0.0554) 
newsinfluency.negative -0.1785 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 
(0.1430) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
govern_coefricient_negative -0.0008 -0.1760 -0.1654 -0,1656 
(0.0030) (0.1436) (0.1474) (0.1480) 
change of ROE.percentage 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(0.0019) (0.0020) 
Asset 0.0124 0.0164 0.0190 
(0.0228) (0.0235) (0.0236) 
CEO_background -0.0103 -0.0049 0.0009 -0.0139 -0.0028 
(0.0601) (0.0593) (0.0598) (0.0596) (0.0591) 
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Number of Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
R-square 0.0473 0.0186 0.0189 0.0215 0.0279 0.0478 0.0144 
Note: (*) Significant at the 10% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (***) Significant at the 1% 
level. 
In the above table, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns during 60 days 
after the announcement. The explanatory variables are an index indicating the headline news 
and negative news influential power. We also added variables indicating the headline news or 
negative news reports' governmental background. Control variables include percentage change 
of ROE, the companies' asset scale and the dummy variable indicating their CEO's 
governmental background. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
b Already counts both the number of headline news and the circulations for each media which 
published the headline news. Therefore, this measurement is more objective when measuring the 
influence of the headline news than the number of headline news. 
e Each company's news items are published in different newspapers and different newspapers are 
sponsored by different entities. Some of those entities belong to the governmental system, while 
others are civilian. Therefore, to measure how much news of a certain company was actually 
controlled by government, we implement this variable to proxy the government control. 
We did VIF tests for the following regressions to examine the multi-collinearity: 
" l i a b l e V I F 1 / V I F 
log_asset 1.14 0.88 
leverage 1.18 0.85 
ROE一 change 1.10 0.91 
CEO background 1.05 0.95 
newsinfluency一 negative 1.21 0.83 
govern_coefficient_negative 1.20 0.83 
Mean VIF 1.13 — 
So there is no multi-collinearity in the regression. 
BP tests were used to examine heteroskedasticity: the null hypothesis for the following tests are 
there is no heteroskedasticity in the regressions in Model C, but we found heteroskedasticity 
problem in Model B, so robust tests are used for it. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model B 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car—90 
chi2 = 6.64 
Prob > chi2 = 0.01 
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Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in Model C 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of car_90 
chi2 = 0.20 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6552 
Linear Regression Results With "news 
Panel 15B influence coefficient" 
Dependent Variable; CAR一90 
Explanatory Variables: Model B Model C 








govern一 coefficient—negative -0.1419 
(0.1556) 
Leverage 0.0076 0.0114 
(0.0116) (0.0113) 
change of ROE_percentage 0.0093°°° 0 .0106°°° 
(0.0035) (0.0036) 
Asset 0.0054 0.0041 
(0.0275) (0.0280) 
CEO_background 0.0295 0.0324 
(0.0661) (0.0646) 
Number of Observations 119 119 
R-square 0.0232 0.0564 
In the above table, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns during 90 days 
after the announcement. The explanatory variables are an index indicating the headline news 
and negative news influential power. We also added variables indicating the headline news or 
negative news reports' governmental background. Control variables include leverage ratio, 
percentage change of ROE, the companies' asset scale and the dummy variable indicating their 
CEO's governmental background. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 16 Poisson Regression Results with Number of News 
Firstly, we did VIF tests for the following regressions to examine the multi-collinearity, and the 
tests results show no multi-collinearity in the regressions. 
Then BP tests were used to examine heteroskedasticity, and there is no heteroskedasticity in the 
regressions. The null hypothesis for the following tests are there is no heteroskedasticity in the 
regressions. 
Poisson Regression Results With Number of News 
Dependent Variable: Number of Restructuring Deals 
Explanatory 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H Variables: 
Constant -0.9351 -0.8077 -0.7987 -2.4365 -0.7805 -3.2448 -3.3007 -2.6344 
(2.1339) (2.1058) (2.0865) (2.1552) (2.0823) (2.6572) (2.6780) (2.2003) 
CAR_60 -0.5764 -0.4629 0.7232''' 
(0.3639) (0.3750) (0.3767) 
CAR_90 - 0 . 4 8 1 7 - 0 . 4 6 1 6 - 0 . 5 9 1 0口 - 0 . 4 8 3 2 - 0 . 3 8 8 1 
(0.3506) (0.3560) (0.358) (0.3488) (0.3538) 
all—news -0.0014 -0.0009 
(0.0126) (0.0127) 
newsinfluenc -0.0036 0.0022 0.0022 
y—head (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0083) 
govern.coeffi 1.3346口 1.377口 
cient.head (0.703) (0.7109) 
newsinfluenc 0.0005 0.0027 0.0029 
y_negative (0.0153) (0.0139) (0.0143) 
govern.coeffi 2.025° 2.002口 
cient_nega (1.1447) (1.1411) 
0.0107 0.0175 0.0165 0.0221 0.0182 0.0124 0.0072 0.0128 Leverage (0.0708) (0.0698) (0.0696) (0.0708) (0.0696) (0.0678) (0.0687) (0.0720) 
change of 0.227°" 0.246叫 0.244°° 0 . 2 4 7 � ° 0.247°° 0.236°° 0.221™ 0.223°° 
D A P r:i tj u n n a d [i ROE_percen 
tage (0.0391) (0.0415) (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0388) (0.0385) 
0.0481 0.0404 0.0406 0.0567 0.0385 0.0635 0.0682 0.0661 
Asset 
(0.1010) (0.0999) (0.0979) (0.0957) (0.0976) (0.0995) (0.1004) (0.0968) 
CEO_backgr -0.4435 -0.4242 -0.4278 -0.4567 -0.4215 -0.4646 -0.4786 -0.4826 83 
ound (0.3788) (0.3777) (0.3776) (0.3740) (0.3797) (0.3747) (0.3757) (0.3758) 
Number of 
119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Observations 
Pseudo R2 0.0432 0.0418 0.0422 0.0534 0.0418 0.0639 0.0646 0.0557 
Here, the dependent variable is number of restructuring activities. The explanatory variables 
include cumulative abnormal returns during 60 days and 90 days after the announcements, 
index indicating the headline news and negative news influential power, and variables 
indicating the headline news or negative news reports' governmental background. Control 
variables include leverage ratio, percentage change of ROE, the companies' asset scale and the 
dummy variable indicating their CEO's governmental background. We explored whether stock 
price performances after earnings announcements impacts the companies' second year 
restructuring activities. 
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Table 17 Linear Regression Results with Number of News 
Firstly, we did VIF tests for the following regressions to examine the multi-collinearity, and the 
tests results show no multi-collinearity in the regressions. 
Then BP tests were used to examine heteroskedasticity, and there is no heteroskedasticity in the 
regressions. The null hypothesis for the following tests are there is no heteroskedasticity in the 
regressions. 
Linear Regression Results With Number of News Table 17 Dependent Variable; Third Year ROE Percentage Change 
Explanatory 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F 
Variables: 
Constant 6.0576 6.4447 7.1175 7.2377 6.1590 -0.3323 
(6.7875) (6.8271) (7.6875) (7.6594) (6.7856) (-0.3323) 
number of 0.0161 0.0254 0.0344 0.0250 0.0051 0.0118 
restructuring deals (0.0435) (0.0422) (0.0416) (0.0499) (0.0553) (0.0545) 
CAR_60 -1.2235 -1.2374 -1.2792 
(1.3351) (1.3735) (1.3752) 
CAR_90 -1.9611 -1.9516 -2.0411 
(1.9648) (1.9638) (2.0622) 
all—news 0.0167 0.0200 
(0.0199) (0.0224) 
newsinfluency_head 0.0161 0.0226 
(0.0161) (0.0219) 
goveriucoefficient_hea -0.5388 -0.2863 
d (0.5224) (0.4723) 
newsinfluency 一 negativ -0.0027 -0.0039 
e (0.0105) (0.0115) 
govern_coefficient_neg -0.9879 -1.0480 
ative (0.9026) (0.9567) 
- 0 . 0 7 7 0 - 0 . 0 7 7 5 - 0 . 0 8 2 1 - 0 . 0 5 6 6 - 0 . 0 4 9 7 - 0 . 0 4 7 4 
Leverage (o.l498) (0.1517) (0.1494) (0.1222) (0.1206) (0.1198) 
change of 1 .0584�� 1.0636丨丨 1.0502"" 1.1447" 1.1540" 1.1629口 
R O E 一 percentage (0.1458) (0.1499) (0.1369) (0.2220) (0.2331) (0.2397) 
-0.3360 -0.3288 -0.3360 -0.3425 -0.3459 -0.3323 
l o ^ a s s e t (0.3354) (0.3198) (0.3359) (0.3366) (0.3393) (-0.3323) 
CEO_background 0.2770 0.2917 0.2865 0.3570 0.3523 0.3625 
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(0.2431) (0.2406) (0.2472) (0.3166) (0.3168) (0.3129) 
Number of 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Observations 
R2 0.1582 0.1611 0.1599 0.1878 0.1869 0.1911 
Here, the dependent variable is third year ROE percentage change. The explanatory variables 
include number of restructuring activities, cumulative abnormal returns during 60 days and 90 
days after the announcements, index indicating the headline news and negative news influential 
power, and variables indicating the headline news or negative news reports' governmental 
background. Control variables include leverage ratio, percentage change of ROE, the 
companies' asset scale, and the dummy variable indicating their CEO's governmental 
background. We explored whether the restructuring activities during the second year together 
with the stock price performances impacts the companies' third year performances. 
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Table 18 Final Event Study Results 
-0.257877 0.012697 0.170821 0.190249 
-0.029322 0 . 1 2 6 1 5 7 ~ 0.182736 0.2478 0.029389 0.029389 
0.013732 -0.101229 -0.148073 — -0.139829 -0.054228 -0.093422 -0.082872 
0.12271 0.065808 0.096729 0.036914 0.113544 
0.017629 -0.020271 0.098802 0.399706 
-0.007567 ~ 0 . 1 2 7 6 5 6 0 . 3 0 1 2 8 1 0-26359 0.070648 0.025755 
-0.003203 0.188936 0.223419 0.294951 0.113105 
-0.015385 -0.07514 -0.170373 -0.172704 
0.011126 0.099783 0.07529 0.106194 -0.010686 
0.01941 - 0 . 0 3 5 7 4 7 ~ -0.144277 -0.041723 0.013924 
-0.020891 -0.073439 -0.059771 -0.051176 -0.05558 
0.013899 0.1251 -0.001114 -0.009788 0.02541 0.02541 0.054513 
" ~ 0 . 1 0 0 4 0 8 0 . 1 2 6 2 1 3 0 . 2 0 7 2 4 4 一 0 . 3 3 8 7 8 2 0 . 0 6 6 2 1 4 0 . 0 6 6 2 1 4 - 0 . 0 8 5 9 3 8 
-0.025501 0.0834590.238007 0-230519 -0.024415 彻 應 斗 
0.009553 0 J ^ 9 0 . 6 7 1 3 1 9 “ 0.672895 -0.068901 -0.068901 -0.332964 
-0.081982 0.01736-0.036826 -0.075358 續 簡 
~ ~ 0.29401 0 . 3 1 8 9 9 1 ~ 0.566476 “ 0,856486 一 -0.023217 -0.023217 -0.023217 -0.043152 
-0.078059 “ - 0 . 0 9 9 3 0 1 - 0 . 1 0 4 6 5 3 -0.061743 -0.150847 -0.150847 
-0.06253 - 0 . 2 2 3 0 8 ~ -0.294431 -0.179011 -0.105706 -0-105706 
-0.070682 -0.066379 -0.171459 -0.087286 -0.08155 -0.08155 -0.033006 -0.033006 
-0.005362 ~ - 0 . 1 4 7 8 0 1 ~ ~ 0.11104 0.076551 
-0.069923 ~ - 0 . 1 7 5 0 2 1 - 0 . 0 2 1 6 -0.094218 0.037875 
-0.083707 -0.155058 -0.209006 -0.133771 
0.000131 0 . 1 2 7 0 7 4 ~ 0.153185 “ 0.131259 
-0.082216 - 0 . 1 4 4 8 5 3 - 0 . 2 3 7 5 9 5 -0.297456 
0.082568 “ 0 . 1 2 5 7 8 1 - 0 . 0 2 8 1 “ -0.161834 0.057758 
0.01982 0.000736^ 0.607459 0.606545 0.082904 
0.038892 - 0 . 0 9 9 9 9 - 0 . 1 7 8 8 9 7 -0.129359 
—0.155994 0.190484 0.127019 -0.030477 0.157101 0.157101 - 0細 2 1 
0.022579 “ - 0 . 1 1 0 5 1 6 0 . 1 4 6 2 1 6 “ 0.176012 -0.08685 
~ 0 . 0 0 4 0 9 5 0.103673 — 0.11933 ~"o.083167 0.011303 0.096967 
0.039757 -0.013994 0.063638 0-099645 
"~~-0.012667 -0.091616-0.108444 -0.185751 -0.002189 
0.145688 0.666919 0.895637 0.87603 0.蕭57 
"~-0.021491 ~ ~ - 0 . 0 7 0 5 1 7 -0-14686 -0.059344 0.035942 -0.019034 
-0.004686 -0.033908 0.04365 0.099573 
-0.003863 - 0 . 2 6 7 9 7 - 0 . 1 2 8 6 4 -0.128174 -0.011001 
0.111968 0.020436 0.206578 0-270786 
-0.242179 0.096527 0.247141 -0.017665 
87 
0.036674 0.084557 0.005709 0.032957 0.087324 0.087324 
0.029711 -0.109066 -0.270857 -0.267384 
0.111064 0.097121 - 0 . 0 6 7 6 4 3 ~ -0.077515 “ 0.069611 0.069611 -0.017916 -0.017916 
-0.054928 -0.184107 0.081774 -0.073122 -0.046224 
-0.10819 -0.117158 -0.038551 0.059271 
-0.021653 - 0 . 1 4 2 6 7 5 0 . 0 8 4 5 4 7 0.087389 -0.033747 
-0.034796 0.068071 0.05804 0.001132 0.01405 
-0.040472 -0.135108 -0.165089 -0.092348 '0.031 
-0.03069 -0.183449 0.034565 -0.041984 
0.009915 0.143405 0 . 1 8 6 5 2 6 ~ 0.254054 0.020235 0.069382 0.03756 
0.136791 0 . 1 7 4 3 6 2 ~ 0.171343 0.123084 0.131858 0.077716 0.077716 
-0.050103 -0.116052 -0.595048 -0.630955 -0.075358 -0.075358 .0.0SS991 
-0.041574 -0.234915 -0.236413 -0.04398 -。塵例 
-0.030481 ~ - 0 . 0 4 3 5 2 5 0 . 3 5 2 3 4 2 0.571987 -0.101077 -0.101077 
0.022873 -0.079542 0.074812 -0.044498 -0.068542 
0.653376 “ 0 . 6 5 3 3 7 6 0 . 6 5 3 3 7 6 0.653376 0.570646 0.570646 
0.293007 “ 0 . 5 4 3 6 4 3 0 . 7 3 1 4 6 3 0.685448 0.259932 0.259932 
-0.03329 0.00193 0 . 0 2 8 6 8 2 0 . 0 6 7 9 4 9 -0.023465 -0.023465 
- 0 . 0 0 3 8 7 8 “ - 0 . 0 6 9 4 4 6 - 0 . 0 2 6 5 8 2 一 - 0 . 0 4 9 6 5 5 - 0 . 0 4 5 7 2 2 - 0 . 0 4 5 7 2 2 
-0.032107 -0.063424 0.065153 0313309 
0.207433 0.0872350.174518 0.383202 一 0.118458 0.118458 0.098385 0.098385 
-0.01479 - 0 . 0 0 6 8 9 5 - 0 . 0 1 3 9 9 9 0.007399 
-0.062434 一 - 0 . 0 1 0 6 6 7 ~ 0.161261 “ 0.188069 0.062802 
-0.038641 - 0 . 0 0 7 3 9 7 - 0 . 0 0 4 5 1 5 0.079689 
-0.01193 一 - 0 . 0 1 2 3 7 3 0 . 0 3 6 8 5 5 “ 0.019503 0.004498 
0.049077 0 . 1 8 0 2 4 0 . 1 4 0 5 0 5 0.172996 0.086935 
-0.009588 0.114207 0.290992 0-255587 
0.075811 “ 0 . 5 4 3 4 0 2 0 . 3 5 9 5 3 6 0.00057 -0.099906 
-0.041087 “ - 0 . 0 3 8 6 8 2 0 . 1 2 4 3 6 2 “ 0.031135 -0.071545 -0.071545 
-0.350016 ~ - 0 . 1 5 2 2 9 6 ~ 0.073818 0.033561 
-0.557204 -0.434838~ -0.384065 一 -0.343023 -0.582233 
0-030972 ~ - 0 . 0 5 7 6 5 6 ~ -0.360446 -0.454701 
0.020868 0 . 0 6 8 4 5 5 - 0 . 0 0 9 3 8 1 -0.049187 0.058177 
0.093353 0 . 0 4 2 6 7 6 - 0 . 2 3 8 9 2 5 -0.231308 0.001877 0.046021 -0.052626 
-0.001211 0 . 0 1 0 4 1 9 - 0 . 0 7 0 8 3 2 0.116672 0.031761 
-0.006982 ~ - 0 . 0 0 2 7 6 2 0 . 0 2 7 7 1 -0.041715 0.017425 
-0.084341 -0.110346 -0.123664 -0.100227 -0.131314 -0.121344 -Q-^31314 
-0.523815 -0.441343 -0.281903 0.28165 
0.019274 -0.015175 0.068836 0.123178 
0.034795 0.102272 -0.325827 -0.182225 
0.089086 0.273125 0.395959 0-532224 
-0.159359 0.282307 0.210885 0-292595 
-0.018295 -0.148019 -0.14663 -0.231596 -0.079406 
88 
-0.050912 -0.218512 -0.034623 0.000889 —~0.017148 
-0.345927 -0.277489 -0.21796 -0.388862 -0.278332 
-0.01729 -0.083494 -0.248496 -0.317728 -0.040467 -0.063252 
0.001071 0.592199 0.462072 0.766998 
-0.025555 -0.032936 0.049584 0.033202 -0.018006 
0.011018 0.012714 0.010477 -0.092273 -0.008461 
-0.039625 0.170712 0.10119 0.098495 
-0.13115 0.125906 -0.03701 0.048869 
0.049274 0.100061 0.114734 0.158737 0.043667 0.043667 
-0.410706 -0.426299 -0.37819 -0.606957 
-0.020392 -0.050811 -0.07471 -0.057094 
0.074484 0.081636 -0.020153 -0.009062 -0.001765 
0-012944 -0.083699 -0.178786 -0.272919 0.004666 
0.052436 -0.036903 0.027532 0.247439 
0-044118 0.055869 0.415329 0.396688 
-0.074533 -0.262517 -0.057095 -0.180698 
0.010889 0.13 -0.010978 0.054819 -0.006763 
0-025514 0.002355 0.007654 -0.006487 0.001612 -0.115449 
-0.012795 -0.03228 -0.319607 -0.325156 -0.037407 
-0.068608 -0.063157 -0.104069 -0.177984 0.005386 -0.063485 
-0.008393 0.08866 0.22064 0.172339 -0.01657 0.068475 0.071752 
0000962 0.063944 0.074493 0.160899 0.01247 
0-007001 0.189542 0.092021 0.059601 0.017903 
0.020627 0.110915 0.152699 0.115633 0-136099 
0.011152 -0.154138 -0.10954 -0.094222 
-0.003737 -0.144874 -0.019302 0.105938 
0.124278 0.162509 0.540145 0.433176 -0.120547 0.135415 
0.093294 0.509981 0.721872 0.476562 0.043283 
0.035102 -0.090077 -0.74938 -0.71702 -0.046476 
0.043097 -0.133724 -0.145911 -0.239613 -0.028303 -0.040481 -0.040481 
0-137335 0.119674 -0.196772 -0.2826 0.071779 
-0.600256 -0.390006 -0.244075 -0.295413 -0.286283 
0.020467 0.082568 0.088329 0.08336 0.034153 0.050785 
0.05433 0.19682 0.215829 0.254208 
-0.01362 -0.082588 0.136285 0.12085 
-0.034336 -0.037693 -0.050167 -0.012699 -0.000125 -0.000125 
-0.004763 -0.190524 -0.238203 -0.175149 -0.103346 -0.022822 -0.103346 
This lists all the main study event result of the samples. Each row stands for a single sample. The 
first column lists all samples' CAR between -3 day and +3 day; the second to fourth columns 
represent CAR between -3 day and +30 day, -3 and +60 day, -3 and +90 day, respectively. The 
fifth and sixth columns give the CAR during the 10 days after the first headline news and CAR 
during the 10 days after the first negative news. The last two columns give CAR during the 10 




means the news announced at least three days after the earnings announcements. 
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Appendix 1: S a m p l e Companies 
Stock Code Company Name Targe t Yea r A n n o u n c e m e n t Date 
000014 沙河股份(華源實業） 1998-1999-2000 2000-4-20 
000047 ST 中橋 1998-1999-2000 2000-4-20 
000055 方大 A 1998-1999-2000 2000-1-27 
000498 ST 丹化 1998-1999-2000 2000-4-7 
000561 SST 長嶺 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000582 S 北海港（北海新力） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000600 建投能源（國際大廈） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000710 天興儀錶 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000758 中色股份（中國有色金屬） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000769 ST 大菲（大連盛道） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000783 S*ST 石谏（石家莊谏油化工股份）1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000829 天音控股（贛南果業） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000868 安凱客車 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000893 廣州冷機 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
001696 宗申動力（成都聯益） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600087 南京水運 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600097 華立科技（恒泰芒果） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600103 青山紙業 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600106 重慶路橋 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600110 中科英華（長春熱縮材料） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600123 蘭花科創 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600137 *ST 長控 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600623 輪胎橡膠 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600640 中衛國脈（國邁通信） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600650 錦江投資（新錦江） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600675 中華企業 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600743 SST 幸福 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600744 華銀電力 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600746 江蘇索普 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600753 ST 冰熊 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600804 鵬博士（成都工益） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600810 神馬實業 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600831 廣電網路（黃河機電） 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600839 四川長虹 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
600896 中海海盛 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 
000826 G 合加 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-26 
000422 G 宜化 1999-2000-2001 2001-2-22 
600727 魯北化工 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-6 
000420 G 吉纖 1999-2000-2001 2001-2-26 
600203 福日股份 1999-2000-2001 2001-3-16 
600057 G 夏新 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-6 
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000536 ST 閩閩東 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-28 
600818 G 永久 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-28 
600786 東方鍋爐 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-3 
600609 金杯汽車 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-11 
000736 ST 重實 1999-2000-2001 2001-2-13 
600080 金花股份 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-12 
000909 G 數源 1999-2000-2001 2001-3-21 
000583 *ST 托普 1999-2000-2001 2001-1-17 
600756 浪潮軟體 1999-2000-2001 2001-1-17 
600791 G 天創 1999-2000-2001 2001-3-29 
000007 深達聲 A 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-18 
000809 中匯醫藥 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-28 
000699 *ST 佳紙 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-24 
000728 北京化二 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-20 
600871 儀征化纖 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-2 
600699 遼源得亨 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-21 
000050 深天馬 A 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-17 
600637 G 上廣電 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-20 
000636 G 風華 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-17 
000751 G 鋅業 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-16 
600172 G 旋風 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-12 
000656 ST 東源 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-25 
000878 G 雲銅 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-12 
000571 新大洲 A 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-29 
000927 一汽夏利 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-12 
600183 G 生益 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-13 
600104 G 上汽 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-26 
000557 •ST 廣夏 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-30 
000518 四環生物 2000-2001-2002 2002-1-22 
000766 *ST 通金 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-29 
0 0 0 0 3 0 *ST 盛潤 A 2000 -2001 -2002 2002-4-19 
600368 五洲交通 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-21 
000828 G 東控 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-27 
600654 G 飛樂 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-30 
000008 G 寶利來 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-29 
600728 新太科技 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-13 
600766 *ST 煙發 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-18 
000010 深華新 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-26 
600732 G 新梅 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-16 
600749 G 聖地 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-6 
600695 •ST 大江 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-26 
000681 遠東股份 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-15 
600260 G 凱樂 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-5 
600091 明天科技 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-12 
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000890 G 法爾勝 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-10 
000962 G 東方钽 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-11 
000777 中核科技 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-25 
600202 哈空調 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-16 
000595 G 西軸 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-17 
600842 GST 中西 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-25 
600800 天津磁卡 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-28 
000958 東方熱電 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-28 
000415 匯通水利 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-19 
000555 ST 太光 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-16 
600837 G 都市 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-31 
000560 ST 昆百大 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-2 
600603 ST 興業 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-26 
600358 國旅聯合 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-25 
600275 武昌魚 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-23 
600159 G 大龍 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-30 
600090 G*ST 酒花 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-30 
600053 ST 江紙 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-29 
000859 G 國風 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-6 
600714 金瑞礦業 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-23 
600892 ST 湖科 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-21 
000561 *ST 長嶺 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-31 
600843 上工申貝 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-17 
600396 G 金山 � 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-6 
000797 中國武夷 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-22 
600776 東方通信 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-23 
600522 中天科技 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-30 
600153 G 建發 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-21 
600634 海鳥發展 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-10 
000006 G 深振業 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-21 
000613 *ST 東海 A 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-16 
600138 G 中青旅 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-24 
600054 G 黃山 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-16 
000978 桂林旅遊 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-18 
94 
Appendix 2: Record of News Repor ts for Each F i r m 
Stock Code Total News Headline news Negative news 
000014 0 
000047 1 1 
000055 1 1 
000498 5 4 1 
000561 32 11 2 
000582 0 
000600 0 
000710 4 1 
000758 7 3 
000769 3 1 
000783 10 
000829 5 1 
000868 10 3 
000893 2 
001696 6 4 
600087 0 
600097 3 1 
600103 6 
600106 3 2 
600110 2 
600123 4 2 
600137 4 1 4 
600623 3 1 
600640 3 





600753 4 1 1 
600804 0 
600810 12 
600831 6 3 
600839 34 8 3 
600896 1 
000826 5 
000422 14 2 1 
600727 9 
000420 6 1 
95 
600203 7 2 
600057 17 6 3 
000536 22 7 2 
600818 5 1 4 
600786 7 1 
600609 27 9 
000736 1 
600080 10 1 2 
000909 21 5 1 
000583 33 13 
600756 23 22 
600791 1 1 
000007 7 1 1 
000809 4 1 2 
000699 6 3 5 
000728 10 2 3 
600871 2 0 4 1 
600699 5 2 1 
000050 2 
600637 28 5 
000636 2 1 
000751 4 1 
600172 4 1 
000656 9 8 3 
000878 5 1 
000571 15 3 4 
000927 41 13 9 
600183 5 2 1 
600104 25 5 
000557 6 2 2 3 9 
000518 8 4 
000766 14 2 8 
000030 13 5 1 
600368 2 
000828 3 2 3 
600654 7 1 
000008 15 4 3 
600728 4 1 
600766 2 1 1 
000010 2 1 
600732 1 1 
600749 2 1 
600695 3 2 
681 2 1 
96 
600260 11 2 2 
600091 4 
000890 3 1 
000962 6 2 
000777 2 1 
600202 1 1 
000595 3 
600842 2 1 2 
600800 3 1 
000958 6 1 3 
000415 6 2 
000555 1 1 
600837 1 1 
000560 2 1 1 




600090 11 6 4 




000561 9 3 2 
600843 3 2 
600396 3 
000797 0 
600776 16 4 4 
600522 1 
600153 10 1 





000978 2 1 1 
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Appendix 3: Number of Restructuring Activities During the Second Year 
stock Code Target Year Announcement Date No. of Restructuring Activities 
000014 1998-1999-2000 2000-4-20 6 
000047 1998-1999-2000 2000-4-20 1 
000055 1998-1999-2000 2000-1-27 0 
000498 1998-1999-2000 2000-4-7 0 
000561 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 3 
000582 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
000600 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 2 
000656 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 1 
000710 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
000758 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
000769 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
000783 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
000829 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 2 
000868 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
000893 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 3 
001696 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
600087 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
600097 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 1 
600103 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 2 
600106 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 2 
600110 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 2 
600123 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
600137 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 5 
600623 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 1 
600640 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
600650 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
600675 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 8 
600743 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 1 
600744 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 2 
600746 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
600753 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
600804 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 1 
600810 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 0 
600831 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 1 
600839 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 1 
600896 1998-1999-2000 1999-12-31 1 
000826 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-26 1 
000422 1999-2000-2001 2001-2-22 2 
600727 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-6 0 
000420 1999-2000-2001 2001-2-26 0 
600203 1999-2000-2001 2001-3-16 3 
600057 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-6 0 
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600818 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-28 3 
600786 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-3 0 
600609 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-11 1 
000736 1999-2000-2001 2001-2-13 1 
600080 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-12 1 
000909 1999-2000-2001 2001-3-21 1 
000583 1999-2000-2001 2001-1-17 3 
600756 1999-2000-2001 2001-1-17 1 
600791 1999-2000-2001 2001-3-29 3 
000007 1999-2000-2001 2001-4-18 3 
000809 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-28 1 
000699 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-24 1 
000728 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-20 0 
6 0 0 8 7 1 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 - 4 - 2 0 
600699 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-21 3 
000050 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-17 0 
600637 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-20 2 
000636 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-17 0 
000751 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-16 0 
600172 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-12 0 
000878 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-12 0 
000571 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-29 3 
000927 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-12 1 
600183 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-13 0 
600104 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-26 3 
000557 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-30 6 
000518 2000-2001-2002 2002-1-22 0 
000766 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-29 2 
000030 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-19 0 
600368 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-21 0 
000828 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-27 1 
600654 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-30 2 
000008 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-29 3 
600728 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-13 2 
600766 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-18 0 
000010 2000-2001-2002 2002-3-26 4 
600732 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-16 1 
600749 2000-2001-2002 2002-4-6 3 
600695 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-26 5 
000681 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-15 0 
600260 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-5 0 
600091 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-12 3 
000890 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-10 0 
000962 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-11 1 
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000777 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-25 0 
600202 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-16 2 
000595 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-17 2 
600842 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-25 5 
600800 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-28 3 
000958 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-28 4 
000415 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-19 0 
000555 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-16 0 
600837 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-31 5 
000560 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-2 1 
600603 2001-2002-2003 2003-4-26 0 
600358 2001-2002-2003 2003-3-25 1 
600275 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-23 0 
600159 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-30 0 
600090 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-30 0 
600053 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-29 0 
000859 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-6 0 
600714 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-23 0 
600892 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-21 0 
000536 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-22 0 
600843 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-17 0 
600396 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-6 0 
000797 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-22 0 
600776 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-23 0 
600522 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-30 0 
600153 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-21 0 
600634 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-10 0 
000006 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-21 0 
000613 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-16 0 
600138 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-24 0 
600054 2002-2003-2004 2004-4-16 0 
000978 2002-2003-2004 2004-3-18 0 
max 8 
100 
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